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 Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the factors that determine the performance of everyday 
action. Six empirical chapters are subsequently presented. First, I sought to 
investigate the effects of the presence of distractors and of task load on the 
performance of everyday life tasks, comparing a patient with ADS and controls 
operating with a task load (Chapter 2). The data indicate that controls and patients 
with ADS may suffer different demands. 
The role of the task schema on ADL was examined in Chapter 3. The results 
showed that there is a problem in using task schema to drive action under the on-line 
constraints of performing the action. Relation between object recognition and action 
was tested in Chapters 4 and 5. I showed that ‘object use’ effect was maintained even 
when the patients showed impaired semantic access for the objects.  
The final empirical study (Chapter 7), investigated the role of eye movements 
on performing an everyday. There were proportionately more unrelated fixations and 
more fixations concerned with locating objects in the ADS patient than in controls. In 
addition, eye movements away from objects being used were made earlier in the ADS 
patient, and toying errors were linked to multiple, brief fixations being made to the 
object involved. 
In the final chapter (8), I review the evidence from across the thesis and 
discuss the implications of the work for understanding both normal and disordered 
everyday actions. The results not only point to the complexity of processes supporting 
such actions, but also to the critical interactions between action and attention in such 
tasks. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Most of our behaviour in everyday life is composed of routine activities such as 
grooming, dressing, eating, etc. Despite such activities being well-practised and often 
undertaken without creating large demands on attention, there are numerous different 
processes involved – from recognising the objects present, to recalling a schema for 
the task, to ordering the sequence of steps and keeping track of the steps are carried 
out. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the complex and multiple factors involved, the 
performance of everyday actions can break down after neurological damage. For 
example, patients with ‘action disorganisation syndrome’ (ADS; Schwarz, 1995) 
make abnormally large numbers of errors both in using individual objects and also in 
carrying out all the steps in a task in the right order. Given the central role such 
activities play in naturalistic human behaviour, it is important to understand how 
neurological disorders influence everyday action skills and how best to assess and 
ameliorate the impairments that may arise. In order to identify such problems and to 
rehabilitate them, neuropsychologists need to understand the cognitive mechanisms, 
which influence our everyday action.  
To illustrate the factors involved consider the relatively simple everyday task 
of applying butter and then cheese to bread. This may involve grasping a butter knife 
with an appropriate grip, dipping it in butter, spreading it on the bread then using a 
different knife to cut the cheese and then to lay it on the bread - in each case making 
sure that appropriate amounts of butter and cheese are used. This requires 
remembering information that ensures that the actions (buttering then cutting and 
placing the cheese) are performed in the correct order. It necessitates that the actor 
recognises the differences between the knives, grasping the knives appropriately for 
the actions, possibly ignoring other objects that may be present. Also, if the 
appropriate objects for action are not available (there are no knives on the table), then 
it may be necessary to suspend the routine while fetching an appropriate knife from a 
kitchen drawer. Thus, even this simple task can be decomposed into a set of different 
processes, each of which could be selectively affected by brain lesion. 
 To understand how everyday tasks are planned and performed correctly, we 
have to answer some questions. For example, we need to know the extent to which the 
performance of everyday actions is dependent on our stored knowledge about 
individual objects and actions (see Humphreys & Forde, 1998, vs. Joe, Ferraro & 
Schwartz, 2002). We need to know how our higher-level knowledge of the task 
interfaces with the cognitive resources concerned with the control of visual attention, 
the perception of individual objects, and action to the objects. We need to know how 
sequences of action within individual tasks can be organised when several tasks are 
being conducted at once (e.g. when we make a sandwich while we are answering the 
phone). In terms of clinical treatments and the rehabilitation of disorders of action, we 
need to understand whether impairments in carrying out everyday actions are 
associated with particular pathologies. We also need to know how the use of familiar 
objects, or the instantiation of particular training procedures, can facilitate the 
maintenance or re-learning of everyday tasks. 
 1.2 Theoretical and Empirical Background 
1.2.1 Hierarchical organisation in routine tasks 
Everyday tasks necessitate that actions are performed in an order that leads to the task 
goals being attained. One classic view of how sequential actions are learned and 
performed is that this involves a chain of simple associative links between each action 
and the next (Lashley, 1951).  In contrast, others argue that tasks are based on learned, 
hierarchically-organised schema, cued by environmental events (Cooper and Shallice, 
2000; Humphreys and Forde, 1998; Norman and Shallice, 1986). On this last view, 
sequences of actions can be clustered within a higher-order goal, with the set of 
higher-order goals comprising the schema for the task.  
Humphreys and Forde (1998) studied actions of daily living in both normal 
participants and patients with impaired everyday-life behaviour. They had normal 
participants list the actions they would usually carry out to realize the task, and noted 
that simple component actions could be grouped together into subroutines, which are 
themselves part of larger routines, and so forth (see Figure 1). According to this 
account, the processing system is arranged in layers corresponding to discrete levels 
of task structure, with processing at lower levels guided by input from higher ones. 
Humphreys and Forde argued that simple actions rather than being organized by a 
specific schema, involve the coordination of multiple schemas, associated with 
different levels of temporal structure. 
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                                                                                               to cup                              until tea pours 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchical representation of routine sequential task (Adapted from 
Humphreys and Forde, 1998). 
Cooper and Shallice (2000) incorporated the notion of action hierarchies into 
their model of everyday action, where they simulated action slips in normal 
participants (Reason, 1984) and aspects of the neuropsychological disorder of action 
disorganisation syndrome (see Schwartz, 2006, for a review). Figure 2 shows the 
processing architecture proposed by Cooper and Shallice. In this model the processing 
system is structured as a hierarchy of nodes or units, with units at the lowest level 
representing simple actions, and nodes at higher levels representing progressively 
larger-scale aspects of the task.  The top-down flow of activation to each unit is gated 
until the appropriate preceding actions have been completed. Cooper and Shallice 
showed how a model with a hierarchical architecture could generate errors resembling 
those found in human participants.  
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Figure 2: Schema\goal organisation in the coffee preparation domain. Schema 
are indicated by italic and goals by bold type (adapted from Cooper and Shallice, 
2000). 
These simulation results provide an existence proofs that plausible human 
errors arise when processing breakdown in models that use hierarchical task schema 
to guide the performance of everyday tasks. 
 
1.2.2 Contention Scheduling and the supervisory attention system 
The cognitive neuropsychological analysis of everyday action grew from earlier 
theoretical work distinguishing between automatic and controlled information 
processing (Posner and Synder, 1975; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) and the related 
distinction between routine and nonroutine action selection (Norman and Shallice, 
1980, 1986; Shallice 1972). Norman and Shallice (1986) suggested that routine 
everyday tasks are controlled by a relatively automatic system, which they referred to 
as the Contention Scheduling System (CSS). Norman and Shallice (1986) argued that, 
when a triggering stimulus activates a schema above its threshold, the schema will 
remain active until the action goal is achieved or is actively inhibited by higher level 
attentional control processes. These control processes were proposed to be modulated 
by a Supervisory Attentional System (SAS). This Supervisory system would come 
into play in situations requiring attention to detail, such as when forms of 
troubleshooting are required, when novel actions and plans must be realised, or 
habitual responses need to be suppressed. The SAS controls behaviour by modulating 
the activation values of existing schemas or, if no relevant schemas exist, creating 
temporary new ones to determine action. 
The localization of the CSS and SAS in the brain is still unclear. Norman and 
Shallice (1986) stated that the functions of the CS might be controlled by the basal 
ganglia. However, Rumiati, Zanini, Vorano, and Shallice  (2001) suggest that task 
schemas (presumably part of the CSS) are localized in premotor structures. 
Supervisory attentional functions, in contrast, are considered to be performed by 
frontal structures (Shallice, 1982, 1988). Furthermore, Frith (2000) suggests that the 
dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex plays a critical role in the modulation of CS by the 
SAS.  
Evidence of slips of action by normal participants (Reason, 1984) suggests 
that, without the recurrent intervention of the SAS, the CS is prone to error. For 
example, action slips are typically noted when participants are distracted and not 
attending fully to a task. In a similar vein, Shallice proposed that frontal lobe damage 
might generate dysregulation of the CS by a malfunctioning SAS or, alternatively, it 
may directly disrupt processes within the CS itself. The list of frontal lobe symptoms 
that might be explained in this way included perseveration, poor set switching, and 
utilisation behaviour (Shallice, 1982, 1988; Shallice et al., 1989). 
The hypothesis that disorganized actions can reflect faulty modulation of the 
CS due to an impaired SS has not been proved completely yet. For instance, 
Humphreys and Forde (1998) assessed individual patients on a range of everyday 
tasks. The high rate of errors in two patients (FK and HG) qualified them as having a 
clinical problem reflecting disorganized action. A third patient (DS) was as impaired 
as FK and HG on frontal executive tests but made far fewer errors on the action tests. 
On the standard assumption that poor performance on frontal executive tests 
equivalent to impairment of the SAS, the evidence suggests that impaired SAS do not 
necessarily determine the success of naturalistic action production. 
 
1.3 Lapses and errors in action daily living  
1.3.1 The qualitative classification of errors  
The complexity of the processes that control everyday activities makes performance 
prone to error even in normal participants. These errors (‘action slips’) can be 
informative about the processes underlying the control of routine actions. Reason 
(1979, 1984, and 1990) and Norman (1981) investigated slips and lapses of normal 
volunteers in everyday actions and developed classification systems for the errors 
observed. The most common errors of action included: 
3. Capture: when action is ‘captured’ by familiar but unintended routine (e.g. 
putting on gardening boots upon entering the garage, instead of getting the 
car out as intended); 
4. Omission: where some crucial action or step was left uncompleted (e.g. failing 
to add tea to a teapot before adding water when making a pot of tea); 
5. Anticipation: when the action sequence is performed earlier in the sequence 
than it should (e.g. when filling a bucket from a tap, putting a lid on the 
bucket before turning off the tap); 
6. Perseveration: where an apparently correct action is unnecessarily repeated 
(e.g. adding excessive tea-spoon full of sugar to coffee when distracted by an 
event); 
7. Substitution: when one object or location is used in place of that which should 
be used (e.g. applying shaving cream instead of toothpaste to a toothbrush). 
It is interesting that qualitatively similar error patterns are also found in patients, 
suggesting that errors from both patients and normal participants may stem from the 
same underlying process (e.g., noise or under-activation of the action selection 
system). 
 
1.3.2 The quantitative description of action  
Neuropsychologists have long used functional assessments in the study of patients 
with poor performance in aspects of everyday action (e.g. De Renzi and Luchelli, 
1988; Liepmann, 1900, 1988, 1906/1988; Luria, 1966). Some researchers have 
studied single tasks such as lighting a candle or cigarette (Liempan, 1900, 1905, 1988; 
Luria, 1966), and the others serial behaviours using multi-objects tests (MOT) (e.g. 
De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988; Humphreys and Forde, 1998; Schwartz, Fitzpatrick-De 
Salme, and Carew, 1995). Schwartz et al. (1991) introduced a Multi-Level Action Test 
(MLAT) to assess the accuracy of patient performance in accomplishing everyday 
tasks. The MLAT requires participants to perform a set of naturalistic tasks, such as 
gift-wrapping and preparing a lunch box, which had to be accomplished a number of 
times but without immediate repetition. The MLAT was simplified later into the 
Naturalistic Action Test (NAT), which includes both isolated tasks (e.g. making a 
sandwich) and more extended activities (e.g. preparing breakfast). Schwartz et al. 
(1991) developed an action coding system (ACS) for measuring performance on this 
and other everyday tasks, where behaviours were divided into smaller units of action 
(A-1).  Schwartz et al. defined the basic unit of action “to be the smallest component 
of a behavioural sequence that achieves a concrete, functional result or 
transformation, describable as the movement of an object form one place to another or 
as a change in the state of an object” (p.384). At the next level a number of A-1s  
(e.g., lift the milk, open the milk, move the milk to milk bottle to the teacup, and pour 
the milk in tea) make an A-2 step (e.g., put milk in the cup), if the A-1’s are ordered in 
a principled way. This A-1 to A-2 relationship   reflects the different levels within a 
hierarchy of actions leading to the completion of the sub-goals making up complex 
tasks.  
 
1.3.3 Error rates and error profile 
This action coding system has been used to study a number of different patient groups 
including individuals with closed head injury (CHI: n = 30; Schwartz et al. 1998), left 
hemisphere stroke (LCVA: n = 16; Buxbaum et al., 1998), and right hemisphere 
stroke (RCVA: n = 30; Schwartz, et al., 1999). It has also been employed  in case 
studies of disorganised action (e.g. Schwartz et al., 1991, 1995; Schwartz et al., 1993; 
Forde and Humphreys, 2000, 2002; Humphreys and Forde, 1998), as well as in 
patients diagnosed with degenerative dementia (Giovannetti, Libon, Buxbaum, and 
Schwartz, 2002) in order to measure and compare errors.  
De Renzi and Lucchelli (1988) categorized patient errors on a multiple objects 
test into six types. The most frequent error type was the omission of a necessary step. 
Only one patient who was least severe on most measures in their group of 20 made no 
omission errors. Object misuse and action mislocation were the other common errors. 
There were more moderate rates of general clumsiness and low rates of anticipatory 
sequence errors. The MLAT studies demonstrated that errors of action are widespread 
in all neurological groups that were studied (CHI, RCVA, LCVA). In each of the three 
patient groups, omission errors were most common (LCVA: 44%; RCVA: 47%; CHI: 
40%), followed by sequence errors (LCVA: 27%; RCVA: 19%; CHI: 21%). 
Substitution errors and action addition errors also occurred in all groups, at lower 
proportions than omission and sequence errors (Buxbaum et al., 1998; Schwartz et al., 
1998; Schwartz et al. 1999).  Humphreys and Forde (1998) obtained similar trends 
towards omission and sequence errors (they observed 34% omission errors and 40% 
sequence errors in their case studies of two patients with extensive frontal lesions). 
The two other main error types, object substitution and action addition errors, each 
accounted for approximately 10% of errors. 
 
1.3.4 Accomplishment and its correlation with error score 
Schwartz et al. (1998) scored the behaviour of patients on a single accomplishment 
dimension that reflected the percentage of subtasks of the ADL that each participant 
completed, ignoring errors along the way. Schwartz et al. found a strong negative 
correlation between total error score and accomplishment in their study (r = –. 918, p 
<. 001). Patients who make more specific errors tend also to accomplish fewer steps, 
suggesting that both specific errors and accomplished steps provide markers of 
underlying pathology. 
1.3.5 Errors in relation to severity  
The relation of the error profile to severity of deficit has been taken by Schwartz et al. 
as indicating that omissions were particularly indicative of ADS. Omissions were 
common to all the groups tested (RCV, LCV, CHI) and in all patient groups, low error 
producers tended to produce more commission errors, while high error producers tend 
to produce more omission errors. 
 
1.3.6 The effect of distractor objects 
Schwartz et al. (1998) and Buxbaum et al. (1998) also investigated the effect of the 
absence or presence of distractor objects on ADL performance. In one condition 
participants were required to complete an ADL task while seated at a desk with all 
and only those items required for the task present on the desk. In a second condition, 
participants were supplied with several additional items that were not needed for the 
task. It was found that the presence of distractor objects did not lead to inappropriate 
use of those objects. Schwartz et al. (1998) did, however, report an increase in 
omission errors when distractor objects were present. Humphreys and Forde (1998), 
however, reported two case studies and showed no overall effect of distractor on total 
error rates. From these results it is not clear whether distractor objects affect everyday 
action, and, if they do, how these effects come about – for example, do distractors 
compete for selection with targets; do they increase general effects of task load and 
generate errors for that reason? More detailed analysis of when and why distractor 
effects occur may be helpful for understanding how multi-step everyday task are 
performed and how they breakdown after brain lesion. Such an analysis is presented 
in Chapter 2, where the performance of a patient with ADS is compared with how 
normal participants performed the same tasks under conditions of cognitive load. One 
argument is that patients perform poorly with multiple-step everyday tasks because 
they lack sufficient cognitive resources to support the tasks (Schwartz, 1995). If that 
is the case, then the same qualitative pattern of errors should arise in ADS patients 
and in normal participants performing under conditions of cognitive load. For 
example, if a patient shows effects of semantic errors and of the presence of 
distractors on task performance, then so should controls operating under conditions of 
dual task load? This is tested in Chapter 2.   
 
1.4 Neurological disorders  
Everyday action may be affected by a range of specific neurological disorders. The 
two primary disorders of everyday action are apraxia (Luria, 1966; De Renzi and 
Luccelli, 1988) and action disorganization syndrome (Schwartz et al., 1991, 1995, 
1998, 1999). I discuss each of these in turn, emphasising the different errors that 
occur in order to assess whether the problems are qualitatively similar or different. 
1.4.1 Apraxia 
Apraxia is defined as a deficit in the higher order control of motor function in which 
the resulting impaired production of skilled movements cannot be accounted for by 
sensory loss, weakness, tremor, dystonia, ataxia, poor comprehension, or dementia. 
Researchers have attempted to characterise in detail different type of apraxia (e.g. 
Liepmann, 1905).  
Ideomotor apraxia can be defined as a disorder of temporal, sequential, and 
spatial organisation of action (Heilman and Rothi, 1985). It is usually diagnosed on 
the basis of spatio-temporal errors on transitive gesture tasks with single stimuli, 
where patients are required to demonstrate the pantomime linked to object use and/or 
on gesture imitation tasks. Many patients with ideomotor apraxia also have difficulty 
with intransitive gestures. Lipemann (1905) reported patients with parietal lesions 
who were unable to gesture to command or in some instances to imitation. 
Subsequently, Liepmann and Mass (1907) described a patient with a lesion of the 
corpus callosum who was unable to produce gestures with his left hand to verbal 
command. The gestures that such patients produce often contain errors in the spatial 
and temporal parameters of action but correctly specify the semantic content of the 
action. In contrast ideational apraxia is defined as incapacity to evoke mentally the 
action associated with an object (Heilman and Rothi, 1985). So in ideational apraxia, 
gestures may be well formed but unrecognisable or associated with different objects. 
Poeck (1983) includes in the definition of ideational apraxia patients who have 
problems with the sequentional organisation of multi step actions. To differentiate 
such patients from patients making content errors, Ochipa, Rothi, and Heilman (1992) 
proposed the term “conceptual apraxia” to refer to patients showing content errors on 
tasks requiring actions to single objects. 
Liepmann’s original distinction between ideomotor and ideational/conceptual 
apraxia, invites a separation between “central” and “production” forms of action 
impairment. On this account, ideational apraxia is a disorder of the conceptual system, 
which contains knowledge of tool function and actions, whereas ideomotor apraxia is 
a disorder of the production system that includes sensorimotor action programmes 
concerned with the generation and control of movement. Hence, in this dissociation, a 
central deficit could involve a failure to recognise the object or to understand the 
verbal command linked to a given action, due to the central conceptual impairment. In 
contrast a production form of action impairment can co-occur not only in intact 
recognition of gesture but also intact imitation, alongside impaired gesturing to verbal 
command (Heilman, 1973). In chapter 4, I will examine aspects of apraxic errors with 
single objects in order to understand the nature of these deficits too. 
 
1.4.2 Action Disorganisation Syndrome (ADS) 
Schwartz et al. (1991, 1995, 1998) and Humphreys and Forde (1998) investigated 
action disorganization on everyday tasks following frontal injury. Action 
disorganization syndrome is a term to describe patients who make abnormally high 
numbers of errors on familiar multiple-step tasks, where the deficits are not due to a 
motor impairment or to a deficit in object recognition. Such patients make frequent 
errors when dressing, grooming, eating, and so on. They misuse objects, perform 
actions out of sequence, terminate tasks prematurely, and perseverate on the task or its 
components (see Schwarz, 1995). There are a few similarities between the type of 
errors in ADS and Apraxia. For instance, some errors in ADS patients can reflect 
apparent conceptual problems. Schwartz et al. (1991) studied a patient (HH) with 
damage to and beyond the frontal lobes. On a task requiring eating from the hospital 
breakfast tray, HH spooned a pat of butter into his coffee; on another occasion he 
poured coffee into his bowl of oatmeal. In a later study Schwartz et al. (1995) studied 
a CHI patient (JK), who started to spread shaving cream onto his toothbrush. When 
stopped by the therapist, and without specific instruction from her, he reached into his 
grooming kit, extracted the toothpaste tube, and proceeded to brush his teeth in the 
appropriate manner. These errors in ADS patients resemble ideational/conceptual 
apraxia.  
However, all aspects of ADS cannot be accounted for in terms of ideational 
apraxia. There are patients who perform well with single objects but have problems in 
performing everyday action; for instance Forde and Humphreys (2000) studied a 
patient (HG) who was able to name, gesture the use, and provide definitions for 
almost all objects presented but he was severely impaired at using the objects in a 
range of relatively routine everyday tasks and the ADS problems emerge only in the 
context of the everyday task.  
There is evidence too that actions with unusual objects can emerge only in the 
context of the everyday tasks; Bickerton, Humphreys, and Riddoch (2007) examined 
patients with subcortical and frontal damage, who were relatively good at naming or 
showing how the unfamiliar implements could be used outside of the task context in 
isolation. In contrast, errors emerged with the unfamiliar objects during multiple-
object task performance. In this case, as in that noted with patient HG above, 
impairments in a task schema seems to add errors into performance that is not seen 
with individual objects. 
In sum, while there may be some overlap between aspects of apraxia and ADS, 
many of the symptoms of ADS only emerge in the context of the multi-step everyday 
tasks, indicating that performance needs to be examined and measured in the context 
of these tasks in order to understand this disorder. This is what I will do in Chapter 2. 
1.5 Cognitive neuropsychological models of action  
Rothi, Ochipa, and Heilman (1991) developed a model of the praxis system to 
accommodate the various neuropsychological dissociations that have been described 
within the syndrome of apraxia including: problems in gesture imitation, gesture to 
command, and gesture to the sight of objects (Figure 3).  
The model includes two routes to gesture production and imitation. The first is 
an indirect or “lexical” route which processes meaningful actions via access to 
semantic system (conceptual information) and stored movement representations at 
two loci, the input and output action lexica (route “a” in the model). The second is a 
direct route, which bypasses gesture engrams and action semantics and allows 
meaningless gestures to be imitated (route “b” in the model). When this route is intact 
and other routes disturbed then imitation may be preserved even when gesturing to 
verbal command and to visually presented objects is impaired. There are also 
dissociations between gesturing to verbal command and gestures prompted when 
objects are presented in other modalities, including both vision (De Renzi, Faglioni, 
and Sorgato, 1982; Pilgrim and Humphreys, 1991; Riddoch, Humphreys, and Price, 
1989; Rothi et al., 1986) and touch (De Renzi et al., 1982). 
The modality-specific apraxias, for vision and touch, have led to suggestions 
that there are direct modality-specific routes to action in addition to those for 
imitation, again bypassing the semantic system (routes “d” and “e” in Figure 3) 
(Riddoch et al., 1989; Rothi et al., 1991). I review below whether the proposal of 
these routes, alone, can account for these modality-specific apraxias. 
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Figure 3: The multiple-route model of action (extracted from Rothi et al, 1991). 
The argument for direct modality-specific routes to action are supported by 
other pieces of neuropsychological evidence; for example, in syndromes such as optic 
aphasia, patients can show a good ability to gesture along with impaired naming of 
visually presented objects. In addition, where tested such patients have demonstrated 
poor matching of objects based on inter-object associative relation. This suggests that 
there is a deficit in accessing semantic knowledge (e.g. Riddoch and Humphreys, 
1987). The relatively presented gestures in these patients then may be attributed to a 
direct, non-semantic route from vision (route “d”) (Riddoch and Humphreys, 1987). 
An analogous argument can be made concerning naming deficits specific to the tactile 
modality (Route “e”) (Beauvois, Saillant, Meininger, and Lhermitte, 1978). 
It is also possible that links may be established between the parts of objects 
and actions, which are not dependent on access to the structural description of whole 
objects; for example Chainay and Humphreys (2002) studied performance decrements 
when perceptual input is degraded. They found that the patients were impaired at 
gesturing to non-action parts of objects even though they could name the objects from 
parts. 
The model of Rothi et al. (1991) is a traditional ‘boxes and arrows’ model in 
which information is thought to be passed discretely from one processing stage to the 
next. Chainay and Humphreys (2002) proposed an alternative view to this, suggesting 
that activation is passed continuously between processing stages, with the selection of 
the appropriate action for an object based on the convergence of activation from 
multiple systems (modality-independent semantics and modality-specific input 
systems). This ‘convergent activation’ model is able to account for some aspects of 
action selection in patients where the discrete model has difficulty. One example of 
this is the disorder visual apraxia, where a patient is impaired at gesturing to visually 
presented objects even though they are able to gesture when given the object’s name 
(e.g., Riddoch et al., 1989). In such cases patients are able to recognize visually 
presented stimuli (e.g., they pass semantic matching tasks) and they may even name 
visual objects correctly. For a discrete model this disorder is difficult to account for, 
since it is not clear why a patient with good visual object recognition and intact 
semantic access to action cannot gesture to a visually presented object using the intact 
semantic route. This disorder can be account for using the convergent route model, 
however, According to this idea, activation from an impaired visual route to action 
can add noise to activation from the spared semantic route with the system for action 
selection. If selection normally relies on convergent activation from the two routes, so 
the noisy visual route will disrupt action selection (see Yoon, Heinke & Humphreys, 
2002, for an explicit simulation). The convergent route account can also explain some 
benefits to action selection found when patients use objects rather than more 
abstractly pantomiming their use. It has long been know that apraxic patients may 
show better use of objects than gesturing. Chainay and Humphreys (2002) showed 
that patients with this profile could recognise the objects they failed to gesture to, 
irrespective of whether they were just looking at the stimuli or held them in their 
hands (as in the ‘use’ condition). The ‘use’ advantage then cannot come about through 
object recognition improving when objects are held for use, but instead there must be 
some direct effect from object use on the action selection system, by-passing the 
semantic route to action. Again this fits with the idea that there is convergent action 
from touch as well as semantic and visual representations, and that these different 
inputs into action selection normally converge to push the system into a state where 
the appropriate action is selected. In Chapter 4 here I will use the convergent action 
model as a guide for understanding disorders at different ‘levels’ of action selection in 
contrasting patients. 
As noted above, one reason why actions may be performed better when 
patients actually use objects compared with when they mime gestures is that the 
convergence of touch and vision (in the use condition) drives a strong, associated 
action directly (by-passing semantic knowledge). Another way to assess whether this 
direct evocation of action can occur is presented in Chapter 5 here. In Chapter 5, I 
present data from 2 patients with impaired semantic knowledge and consequently 
poor object recognition and naming. Despite this central disturbance I present 
evidence for the first time indicating that the patients are better at identifying objects 
under conditions where they are allowed to use the stimuli compared with when they 
merely look at them or when they are allowed to hold and touch them (but without 
moving the objects). I interpret these data as supporting the argument that, in the 
object use condition, the patients can respond to actions that are directly associated 
with the enriched perceptual input into the action selection system. The patients then 
name objects from the actions that are evoked.  
 
1.6 Effect of therapy on everyday actions  
The successful performance of most routine everyday action is dependent on a 
substantial number of cognitive processes. As mentioned before these cognitive 
processes include: an intact stored knowledge of routine actions; the ability to impose 
such knowledge on behaviour through working memory for action; and an intact 
knowledge of the actions related to individual objects (Humphreys, Forde and 
Riddoch, 2001). Action disorganisation syndrome, the abnormal impairment of these 
abilities, can reflect impairments to these different processes (see Humphreys & 
Forde, 1998). To be successful, rehabilitation would need to be targeted selectively at 
the impairments in order to facilitate performance in a given patient.  
 
1.6.1 Previous studies in rehabilitation of everyday action 
Goldenberg and Hagmann (1998) reported effects of training on patients with some 
degree of apraxia when asked to handle simple and familiar objects. In their 
procedure the therapist led the patient through sets of single-object actions, 
performing the action alongside the patient, and drawing the patient’s attention to the 
functions associated with the perceptual properties of stimuli and to critical features 
of actions linked to these features. Performance was improved on trained but not 
untrained actions. 
Later Goldenberg, Daumuller, and Hagmann (2001) examined performance on 
four complex activities of multi-step daily living (ADL) in order to compare two 
methods of treatment. Here, “direct training” of the activity based on the guided 
performance of the whole activity improved performance of daily living activity while 
“exploration training” alone did not. In the “direct training”, support was given at all 
critical stages and was reduced only as the patient’s competence increased. For 
example, the therapist would take the patient’s hand and lead it through a difficult 
action. In the “exploration training”, the objects involved in an activity were explored, 
but the activity itself was not carried out. The therapist tried to direct the patient’s 
attention to functionally significant details of the object and compared the objects 
with other objects used for either the same or different purposes. For example, the 
serrated knife used for cutting bread was compared with a saw and a plain knife to 
highlight the importance of serration for cutting.  
 In contrast to this, Forde and Humphreys (2000, 2002) tried to investigate the 
implications for therapy of a “non-specific cognitive resources” account of everyday 
life-task performance. The “non-specific cognitive resources” hypothesis (Schwartz, 
1995) predicts that decreasing the cognitive resources required for everyday tasks 
should consistently facilitate performance in ADS patients, if typically they lack 
sufficient resources to perform the tasks successfully. Forde and Humphreys (2000) 
reduced the role of working memory on performance by providing cues to each step 
on a range of everyday tasks. The patient, HG, was given a set of commands to 
follow. Despite the fact that HG could read the commands perfectly well, and even 
though he continuously referred to written commands when doing the task, his 
performance was no better than in a baseline condition (no instructions). They 
suggested that HG’s disorganized behaviour when carrying out everyday tasks was 
not simply due to an inability to maintain a representation of the goal in working 
memory, or to problems in accessing the components steps from action schema, 
because eliminating these requirements did not facilitate his performance.       
Despite this lack of success, other investigators have shown some 
improvements when patients are taught to use an explicit verbalisation strategy.          
Donkervoort et al. (2001) examined the effects of training on a group of left 
hemisphere stroke patients with apraxia. The strategies involved teaching the patients 
to self-verbalise actions, to support their performance. The strategies were shown to 
improve behaviour on a set of everyday tasks, compared with standard occupational 
therapy, in the patients. 
  Pilgrim and Humphreys (1994) similarly used a self-verbalisation strategy to 
facilitate the retraining of action in a patient who was apraxic with single objects. In 
their training programme the patient received both physical assistance and verbal 
guidance when making actions, with the verbal instructions breaking down each 
action into a sequence of steps (reach the beaker, clasp the beaker, carry the beaker to 
my lips). Pilgrim and Humphreys found that the actions made by their patient 
improved for objects subject to action training, but not to control objects for which no 
training was given. 
       Bickerton, Humphreys and Riddoch (2006) investigated the use of a verbal 
rehabilitation strategy in a clear case of ADS (FK). In their training strategy, FK was 
taught a poem based on the steps involved in making a cup of tea. The results showed 
that, after training, the everyday action was performed more successfully than prior 
training but there were not training effects on new tasks or on the same task with a 
different key objects.  
 These results suggest that aspects of everyday action can be remediated and 
that ‘weighting’ impaired semantic and direct-visual routes to action against a more 
spared verbalisation process helps to impose order onto patient performance. In 
Chapter 6 I will present data from a patient showing aspects of limb apraxia where I 
attempt to alter performance by applying multiple cues to the correct action during 
training, and then assessing performance when the cues are withdrawn. The data point 
to the importance of convergent (multi-modal) inputs in re-learning motor actions in 
patients with action disorders.  
 
1.7 Eye movement and action daily living  
Everyday action is hard to study in the laboratory. There are the obvious practical 
impediments to simulating real-world conditions (e.g., at the very least the 
environment will probably not be familiar, where the home environment will), as well 
as difficulties in establishing the requisite degree of experimental control. Creative 
energy has gone into development of laboratory procedures that have face validity and 
that predict real world performance. One technique that is already available and that 
has been used to great advantage with non-neurological subjects is eye movement 
monitoring (Hayhoe, 2000; Land and Hayhoe, 2001). 
Some recent data from eye movement studies of normal people completing the 
everyday task of tea making (Land et al., 1999) suggest that some supervisory type 
processes are employed to guide attention on-line during task performance. In 
particular, Land et al. (1999) found evidence for several different types of monitoring 
(locating, directing, guiding, and checking) that normal people engage in at key points 
during tea making. This monitoring behaviour may reflect supervisory processes that, 
if necessary, modulate activation flow within the CS. If so, the data of Land et al. 
imply that some supervisory processes play important roles in the performance of 
everyday action. It would be most instructive to know how actions and eye 
movements are coupled in patients who do and do not make action errors.  
Forde et al. (in press) provide the first analysis of eye movements in a patient 
with ADS. These authors report that the close coupling between eye movements and 
actions remained relatively preserved in the patient compared with controls (e.g., the 
eyes moved to an object at about the same time as controls, prior to an action being 
effected). This suggests that the coupling of attention to action can remain spared 
even when incorrect actions to objects are selected. On the other hand, the patient 
made frequent eye movements that were unrelated to ongoing actions when certain 
error types occurred (e.g., when there were perseverations). In this case the patient’s 
actions seemed to be disconnected from attentional monitoring. Whether these 
characteristics hold for the eye movements of other patients with ADS will be 
examined here in Chapter 7, where I present data from a study where eye movements 
were monitored in a patient showing ADS.  
 
1.8 The thesis 
This thesis is concerned with the factors that determine the performance of everyday 
action, and how aspects of everyday action (such as using objects for action) 
influence other ongoing processes. Six empirical chapters are presented with deal 
with: 
3. the effects of distractors and task load on the performance of 
everyday life tasks, comparing a patient with ADS and controls 
operating with a task load (Chapter 2);  
4. the role of task schema and the effect of reducing task demands in 
ADS (Chapter 3); 
5. the differentiation between different forms of apraxia, in relation to 
cognitive neuropsychological models of action selection (Chapter 
4); 
6.   the use of action information to overcome visual recognition 
deficits in patients with impaired semantic knowledge about objects 
(Chapter 5); 
7. whether apraxic errors could be improved by the use of convergent, 
multi-model cues during learning, as predicted by accounts such as 
the convergent routes model of action retrieval  (Chapter 6); and 
8. the operation of eye movements in everyday-life tasks in a patient 
with ADS, and whether the coupling of action and attention can 
remained preserved in such cases (Chapter 7). 
 
Altogether the data are informative about the factors that underlie the 
performance of everyday tasks in patients, as well as being informative about how 
constraints during the performance of these tasks impact on object recognition and 
attention, and how basic component actions in the tasks may be remediated. The 
results conform to the view that action retrieval is influenced by inputs from multi-
modal systems which converge to determine action selection, that action information 
can be derived rapidly and influences both object processing and the allocation of 
attention, and action information can break down at different levels, giving rise to 
different problems in performing everyday tasks. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Comparing Action Disorganisation Syndrome and 
Dual-task Load on Normal Performance of Everyday 
Action Tasks 
 
Abstract 
A range of everyday life tasks was used to examine the effects on a patient with action 
disorganisation syndrome (ADS) of having related distractors present during task 
performance. The presence of related distractors increased omission errors in the 
patient. A second experiment assessed whether this pattern of deficit was replicated 
when normal participants carried out the everyday tasks when a secondary task was 
imposed to place demands on executive processes. Secondary task load produced a 
general increase in errors in the controls and it reduced the number of self-correcting 
responses, but there were no proportional increases in omission errors. Control 
participants and patients with ADS may suffer from demands on different process 
involved in the performance of everyday actions. I discuss the implications for 
understanding everyday-action. 
2.1 Introduction 
Following brain damage patients can often have problems in carrying out even simple 
and daily activities that they used to perform pre-morbidly. Schwartz and colleagues 
introduced the term action disorganization syndrome (ADS) to describe patients who 
make many ‘cognitive’ errors, relative to controls, on familiar multiple-step tasks that 
cannot be attributed to motor incapacity (Schwartz, Reed, Montgomery, Palmer, and 
Mayer, 1991) (See chapter 1 for more information). These deficits can be found even 
in patients who show good recognition and gesturing to individual objects (Buxbaum, 
Schwartz & Carew, 1997; Forde & Humphreys, 2000), indicating that ADS does not 
necessarily reflect impairments in object recognition but rather problems in organising 
actions when multiple steps have to be undertaken.  
2.1.1 Quality and quantity of errors 
Schwartz and colleagues developed a standardized scoring system for measuring 
performance on everyday actions in which they classified the kinds of errors made by 
neuropsychological patients (Schwartz et al., 1991; Schwartz, Mayer, Fitzpatrik De 
Salme, and Montgomery, 1993; Schwartz, 1995, Schwartz et al., 1995). In very broad 
terms, they divided action errors into: 
 Errors of omission, which are errors resulting from failures to initiate some 
task-essential action or sequence of actions 
 Errors of commission, which are errors resulting from initiating an action that 
is in some way incorrect or inappropriate 
 
Commission errors may be further subdivided into different sub-types 
including: sequence errors (performing component actions in the wrong sequential 
order), additions (inserting an extra component action incorrectly), semantic errors 
(using an object as another semantically related item), perseverations (repeating an 
action or action sequence once its goal has been achieved), and quality or spatial 
errors (failing to use tools or using excessive quantities of ingredients). Schwartz et 
al. (1998) observed that around 38% of the errors made by their patients were step 
omissions, with sequence errors accounting for another 20% of the errors. Humphreys 
and Forde (1998) found a similar tendency towards omission and sequence errors 
with, respectively, 34% and 40% of their patients’ errors falling into these two 
categories (see also Buxbaum et al., 1998; Schwartz et al., 1999).  
Schwartz et al. (1998) noted that, compared with commission errors, there 
were stronger relations between omission errors and overall measures of clinical 
severity in everyday tasks. In addition, patients and controls were distinguished 
primarily by omission errors, with the proportional distribution of commission errors 
being strikingly similar in the two groups. Omission errors, in particular, may be 
strong indicators of ADS. Schwartz et al. (1998, 1999) also found few differences 
between patients with selective left or right hemisphere lesions and patients with more 
diffuse closed head injuries. They concluded that, rather than suffering deficits in 
particular cognitive processes necessary for everyday action, patients could have 
difficulties due to a general reduction in cognitive resources, with omission errors 
reflecting this reduction in resources. Simulations of this pattern have been reported 
by Cooper, Schwartz, Yule, and Shallice (2005). 
On the other hand, other authors have argued that patients manifesting ADS 
can have a more specific disturbance which affects their stored knowledge of the 
actions that should be performed in the task, along with the order with which the 
actions should be generated. For example, Humphreys and Forde (1998) showed that 
their patients were impaired at ordering descriptions of the actions that comprise 
different everyday tasks suggesting that, in addition to any general loss of processing 
resource, there can be problems in guiding performance based on knowledge about 
the task. 
One aim of this study is to assess whether aspects of ADS can be characterised 
solely in terms of reduced processing resources, or whether performance needs to be 
accounted for in terms of damage to other cognitive components involved in the task. 
To do this, we examined the effects on omission errors when everyday life tasks were 
performed in the context of related and unrelated objects, comparing performance in a 
patient with ADS with that of control participants carrying out the tasks under dual 
task load conditions. The control participants performing under load conditions can 
provide a model of the deficits expected when processing resources are compromised 
(particularly for cases where the overall level of deficit is matched across patients and 
controls). If loss of processing resources is sufficient to account for ADS, then 
qualitatively similar patterns of deficit may be expected in the patient and the 
controls.  
2.1.2. The effects of distraction in normal participants 
Diary studies indicate that “action errors” in normal participants generally occur 
under conditions in which people are distracted or thinking about something else. (e.g. 
Norman, 1981; Reason, 1979). For example, during making a cup of tea one might 
unintentionally pour cold water from a kettle, instead of boiled water, into the teapot. 
People usually notice action errors such as these and spontaneously correct them 
(Cooper et al, 2005). In contrast, self-correction tends not to occur in ADS patients 
(Humphreys & Forde, 1998).  
Differences in self-correction between normal participants and patients may 
reflect the differential operation of the ‘Supervisory Attentional System’ (SAS) in 
these groups.  Norman and Shallice (1986) proposed a model of the control of action 
based around a distinction between two processes: (i) a Contention Scheduling 
System (CSS), which is the substrate of learned responses to stimuli, and activated 
during the execution of routine tasks, and (ii) the SAS, which performs error 
monitoring and which may need to override the activation of the CSS when novel 
behaviors are undertaken. In ADS patients, impairment to the SAS would disrupt their 
ability to monitor error, so that incorrect responses are explicitly generated. However, 
as noted by Schwartz and Buxbaum (1997), damage to the SAS alone may not be 
sufficient to account for ADS. In particular, the normal operation of the CSS should 
be sufficient for routine tasks to be effected. On the other hand, if the SAS were 
intact, then patients ought to be able to employ problem-solving strategies to 
accomplish tasks even without supportive lower-level knowledge (similar to when the 
task itself is unfamiliar). This suggests that ADS may arise out of impairments in both 
lower (CSS) and higher-level procedures (the SAS). 
Which aspects of ADS may reflect damage to the proposed CSS, and which to 
the SAS, is difficult to assess, given that the systems interact to determine behaviour. 
However, attempts to assess the links between the SAS and everyday actions have 
been made by examining the performance of normal participants when they undertake 
everyday tasks under cognitive load (e.g., when performing an irrelevant secondary 
task).   Humphreys, Forde and Francis (2000) tried to experimentally test the role of 
the SAS in performing everyday actions in control participants. They gave 
participants a version of Trails Test (Heaton, Grant, & Mathews, 1991) to load the 
SAS while simultaneously performing the everyday task; this should consequently 
reduce the resources from the SAS that may otherwise support performance. Normal 
controls showed a number of omission and toying errors in action performance and 
some errors in the secondary task, however, these errors were still immediately self-
corrected. From this, Humphreys et al. suggested that the SAS does not only play a 
role in error monitoring (which appeared to continue, despite the secondary task), but 
it also played a role in retrieving actions in the routine task. Thus, as the load on the 
SAS increased, so there was less support from this mechanism for retrieving 
appropriate actions in the right sequence; accordingly, action errors increased. One 
framework for understanding this result was introduced by Humphreys and Forde 
(1998), who proposed that action retrieval in everyday tasks was guided by temporary 
activation of the task steps in working memory, which needed to be maintained for the 
correct actions to be retrieved in the correct order. Proposing a ‘competitive queuing’ 
model, they suggested that the order of actions in everyday life tasks was generated 
through an ‘activation profile’ in processing units representing the order of the steps 
in the tasks. This can be thought of as holding a temporary memory for the steps in a 
task (see Humphreys & Forde, 1998). Disrupting this working memory representation 
will affect action retrieval if there is damage to the activation gradient differentiating 
the steps in the tasks. This will make actions more vulnerable to noise when activation 
values vary. Baddeley (1986) proposed that working memory involved a number of 
core, co-operating systems, including an executive component like the SAS which can 
both hold temporary representations during a task (as suggested by Humphreys and 
Forde, 1998) and monitor for errors. 
In the present study, we assessed whether aspects of the performance of ADS 
patients could be simulated in normal participants carrying out the tasks under 
conditions that load working memory/the SAS. In an extension of Humphreys et al. 
(2000) we examined the effects of having sets of objects from related and unrelated 
tasks as well as the effect of the difficulty of the secondary task. Performance in a set 
of control participants was compared to that of a patient with ADS (patient FK; see 
Humphreys & Forde, 1998). When objects come from related tasks (e.g., two tasks 
both performed in a kitchen or in an office), then there may be more competition to 
select the appropriate object for the task due to distractor objects having some 
association to each task. An analogy for this comes from work with normal 
participants by Moores, Laiti and Chelazzi (2003). They had normal participants 
search for a target object (e.g., a motorbike) and, on some trials, presented a 
semantically related distractor in the display (e.g., a crash helmet). Participants were 
slowed by the related distractor, reflecting the extra time taken to resolve the 
competition for selection when the related distractor was present. In the context of 
everyday life tasks, problems in selecting the appropriate object or action may arise 
when related distractor is present. This could again be due to loss of resources from 
working memory/SAS, if this means that the activation profile favouring task-related 
objects, or a particular order of actions, are disrupted. Problems in selecting the 
appropriate action for the task may also be exacerbated in patients if the task schema 
itself is impaired, and so does not differentially activate the objects to be used for the 
task relative to other objects found in the same context.   In prior reports with FK, 
Humphreys and Forde (1998) showed that he had impaired task knowledge, being 
impaired when asked to sort task steps into the appropriate order. Hence we might 
expect that problems in everyday life tasks in such a patient might increase when 
objects from the same context are present. Experiment 1 focuses on a patient with 
symptoms of ADS and assesses his errors in different everyday actions performed in 
the context of related or unrelated distractors. Does the presence of related distractors 
disrupt performance, and does it do this by selectively increasing particular action 
errors?  Experiment 2 examines the performance of normal control participants under 
dual task conditions, to evaluate if qualitatively similar effects emerge. 
2.2 Experiment 1: Effects of related distractors on everyday action 
Experiment 1 contained 3 conditions involving performance of everyday tasks when: 
(a) semantically related distractors objects were present; (b) unrelated distractors 
objects were present, and (c) no distractors were present. Related distractors may 
increase the competition to select the appropriate target objects for action (Moores et 
al., 2003). If more resources are called upon the select the target under these 
conditions, fewer resources will be available to support other aspects of task 
performance. Performance should thus deteriorate. 
2.2.1 Method 
Participants 
There was one ‘experimental’ participant, FK, and four patient controls.  FK was 37 
years at the time of testing. He suffered carbon monoxide poisoning in 1989 while 
studying for an engineering degree, but has subsequently lived with the full support of 
his family. FK’s personal care is supervised by his family. A Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging scan revealed bilateral damage affecting both the right middle and inferior 
temporal gyri and left inferior temporal gyrus. Another lesion affected the right 
middle occipital gyrus and small lesion in the right medial orbital gyrus (see Figure 4 
for MRI Scan). Previous general cognitive tests shows that FK’s full IQ score after 
accident was 58 (Wechsler, 1981) and his memory performance on the WMS 
(Wechsler, 1990) was less than 50. These scores are substantially lower than would be 
expected from his pre-morbid academic achievement. Assessed through the NART his 
pre-morbid IQ was estimated at 110. FK’s verbal short-term memory is relatively 
intact (digit span= 7). However, he presented with a range of clinical problems 
including: impaired object recognition and naming (Humphreys & Forde, 2005), 
dysexecutive disorders and problems in everyday action (see Humphreys & Forde, 
1998 for more information). Although he had impaired visual object recognition (see 
Humphreys & Forde, 2005), FK was able to carry out the instructions for single 
actions with the objects from the everyday life tasks. FK has previously been reported 
in several papers focusing on ADS (e.g., Humphreys & Forde, 1998) and he was the 
patient who failed to respond to single written commands administered in the context 
of complete tasks, in the study of Forde and Humphreys (2002). His problems in 
everyday action were the focus of the current study. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: FK's MRI Scan 
  
Table 1: Patient characteristic and lesion description 
Patients Sex, 
age 
Handed
ness 
Aetiology Lesion Clinical 
Symptoms 
NART 
(IQ)* 
Brixton Corsi 
block 
Digit 
span 
FK M 
37 
R Carbon 
monoxide 
poisoning 
Right middle 
& inferior 
temporal gyri. 
Inferior 
temporal 
gyrus. Right 
middle 
occipital 
gyrus. Right 
middle orbital 
gyrus 
ADS 
Dysexecut-ive 
syndrome 
Visual object 
recognition 
110 38 4 7 
DB M 
71 
R Stroke Left inferior 
parietal, 
superior and 
middle 
temporal gyri 
Aphasia 95 20 4 4 
MP M 
59 
L Aneurysm Right inferior 
frontal, 
inferior 
parietal and 
superior 
temporal 
Neglect, 
acalculculia 
105 21 3 5 
DS M 
73 
R Stroke Left inferior 
frontal gyrus. 
Left middle 
frontal gyrus. 
Left 
precentral 
gyrus. Left 
poscentral 
gyrus. Left 
caudate & 
putamen. 
Aphasia 105 20 3 4 
TT M 
69 
R Stroke Right inferior 
and middle 
frontal gyrus 
Elements of 
dysexecutive 
syndrome 
115 21 5 5 
* The Brixton test of executive function (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) provides a measure of non-verbal 
executive function. A raw score above 26 indicates a clinical abnormality. 
 
The control patients (DB, MP, DS and TT) were all chronic stroke victims, with TT 
having had the most recent lesion (3 years prior to testing). All were older than FK 
(mean age 68 years), but here the general effects of ageing would act against our 
finding a selective deficit with FK. The control group were an attempt to control for 
both the effects of ageing and of generalised brain lesion  All of the patients (controls 
and FK) would have had experience with the everyday tasks pre-morbidly, though DB 
and MP (and their spouses) confirmed that they rarely carried out tasks involving 
wrapping gifts or making sandwiches. Two patients had unilateral left hemisphere 
damage (DB and DS, with lesions of respectively the tempo-parietal junction and the 
left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and two had right hemisphere lesions (MP and TT, 
with damage respectively to the right superior temporal, inferior parietal and inferior 
frontal regions and to the right middle frontal gyrus) (see Table 1). None of these 
control patients reported evidence of having problems with everyday tasks. Other 
clinical deficits in the patients are noted in Table 1. The control patients only took part 
in the tasks with related objects present. The presence of the control patient tests for 
whether FK presents with ADS, when measured against the performance of other 
patients with brain injury. 
2.2.2 Procedure 
Each patient was tested individually by being placed in front of a table and asked to 
perform a particular task. The tasks were: (i) make a cup of tea with milk and sugar, 
(ii) make a cheese sandwich and put the sandwich in a sandwich bag, (iii) wrap a gift, 
and (iv) write a card and prepare it for the post. These tasks were chosen so that two 
included the preparation of food/ drink and would normally be carried out in a kitchen 
(making tea and making a sandwich); the other two tasks were both typically 
performed on a desk (wrap a gift and write a card). We considered, as semantically 
related, the tasks (and objects) that were normally conducted in the same context (tea 
+ sandwich; gift + card). 
In the semantically related condition, each task was performed with distractors 
from the related task being present in front of the patient when it was performed (e.g., 
the tea task was performed with the sandwich objects present). In the unrelated 
condition (FK only), each task was performed with distractors from an unrelated task 
being present (e.g., the tea task with the objects from the card task present). In no-
distractor condition (FK only) the tasks were carried out without any distractors 
present. The objects were randomly positioned on the table at the start of each trial 
(see Appendix A for a full list of the tasks). Performance was videotaped for later 
analysis. To ensure that any problems were not due to failures to recognize the 
objects, a first session was carried out prior to the everyday tasks in which all of the 
objects were present and the patients were given the name of each object and asked to 
point to it. All participants were able to point to all of the objects used here, indicating 
that problems should not reflect failures in recognition. 
The different tasks, in the contrasting presentation conditions, were carried out 
in a random order. FK performed one task per session to avoid immediate carry-over 
effects. FK also performed each set of tasks twice in order to establish the reliability 
of performance. 
The videos were transcribed to record every action made by each patient. The 
action coding system (ACS) developed by Schwartz et al. (1991) was used to provide 
quantitative and qualitative measures of each subject’s performance. FK’s errors were 
classified into a number of different categories including: 
 Omissions:  When FK omitted one of the steps to accomplish the task. 
 Semantic errors: When a semantically related object was used in place of the 
target object. 
 Sequence errors: When an action was performed in a wrong order (according 
to norms collected in previous studies for these tasks; see Humphreys & Forde 
(1998) (Appendix A). 
 Additions: When FK added an action that was outside the range of actions 
produced by normal participants. 
 Quality/ Spatial errors: When FK misjudged the appropriate amount of a 
stimulus to use (e.g., milk in tea) or the spatial orientation of the objects. 
 Perseverations: When an action or action sequence was repeated after 
achieving its goal. 
 Toying/ Capture: Reaching towards or lifting an object without actually using 
that for any purpose.  
The control patients only performed the tasks with related distractors. 
2.2.3 Results 
Examples of the errors made by FK in the Tea and Card tasks are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Example of errors in two tasks, generated by FK 
 
         
Error type     Examples     
      
Step omission Failure to include milk when making the cup of tea 
  
Failure to stick the stamp on the envelope in the card 
task 
      
Sequence  Adding sugar before pouring tea in the cup 
  
Writing the address before putting the card in the 
envelope 
      
Addition  Drinking milk after making tea  
  Taking the stamp off the envelope 
      
Semantic  
Using a knife to stir the tea instead of a 
spoon  
  Using cello-tape to close the envelope  
      
Perseveration Pouring milk in the cup several times 
  Sticking a second stamp on the envelope  
      
Quality  Pouring too much milk in the cup  
  Sticking the stamp in a wrong place on the envelope 
      
Toying  
Taking the milk carton and then putting it down without 
using it 
  
Picking up the envelope before writing card and then 
putting it down again 
      
      
Number of errors 
The data were analysed by counting the errors in each task. Table 3 shows the total 
number of errors in the three conditions for FK (averaged across two performance of 
each task in each condition), and the mean of the errors across the control patients in 
the related condition. There was a reliable correlation between the numbers of errors 
made by FK across the two performances of each task (see Appendix E for scores of 
two trials), not taking the different conditions into account (r (12) =0.637, p < 0.05). 
In order to justify labeling FK as having ADS, the number of errors he made was 
compared with those made by the control patients in the related distractor condition 
using a between-subjects ANOVA (with patients as the between subject variable, and 
tasks treated as subjects). There was a reliable difference between the patients (F 
(4,15) = 22.19, p<0.001). FK made 9 times the mean of the number of errors made by 
the control patients (FK made an average of 31.5 errors across the tasks, the control 
patients made a mean of 3.5 (range: 2-5), SD=1.7). FK clearly performed outside the 
control range in the related distractor condition. However even in the unrelated and 
basic (no-distractor) task conditions FK’s errors were around 5 and 4 times greater 
than the means of the control patients. This general deficit in FK’s performance held 
also across all the tasks (see Table 3). 
 Comparisons between FK’s performance across the task conditions used a 
repeated measures ANOVA with the factors being condition and time (test 1 and test 
2), taking tasks as subjects. In carrying out this ANOVA it is assumed that FK’s 
performance of the tasks was independent on the different test occasions. Note that 
non-independent performance ought to make the different conditions (with related, 
unrelated and no-distractors) more similar. FK performed worse in the related 
condition compared with the basic condition (F (1, 3) = 33.0, p < 0.01). The trend for 
the number of errors to increase in the related over the unrelated condition was not 
reliable (F (1, 3)=4.53, p=0.123). The unrelated and basic conditions did not differ 
(t<1.0). There were no interactions with time, indicating that the effects generalized 
across the two test sessions. 
 
 
Table 3: Number of errors in each condition in Experiment 1 
              
   Tasks    
           
Patients  Tea Sandwich Gift Card Total 
 Condition      
 Basic 6 2 4 3 15 
FK Related 12 6 6.5 7 31.5 
 Unrelated 3 3.5 5 5 16.5 
       
Mean of 
control 
patients Related 
1.25 
(±0.9) 
0.75 
(±0.5) 
0.75 
(±0.9) 
0.75 
(±0.9) 
3.5 
(±1.7) 
 
 
Accomplishment 
This score was based on the number of steps in each task that participants completed, 
ignoring errors along the way (see Appendix A). FK accomplished an average of 
7.5/27 steps over the repeated performances in the related and unrelated conditions 
and 8.5/27 in the basic condition. There was no effect of condition on this measure of 
his performance (χ2<1.0). He was worse on all conditions than the control patients 
(mean 25.5/27; Fisher exact probability p<0.001 for the comparison with each 
condition).  
 
Type of errors 
The proportions of each type of error, relative to all the errors made by FK in each 
condition are shown in Figure 5. The majority of FK’s errors were step omissions 
followed by toying errors, sequence errors, perseverations and quality errors. The 
errors made by the control patients were much less frequent (see above) though the 
majority were again step omissions (43%) followed by additions (25%), sequence and 
quality errors (12.5%) and toying (6.3%). 
The effects of the conditions on FK’s performance were analyzed by 
comparing, for each error type, the relative number of errors in comparison with the 
number of steps across the tasks (averaged across the two test sessions per task). 
Relative to the steps in the tasks, omission errors increased in the related condition 
compared with both the unrelated condition (χ2 (1) = 4.28, p < 0.05), and the basic 
condition (χ2 (1) = 5.25, p < 0.025). The unrelated and basic conditions did not differ 
(χ2<1.0). There was no evidence for variation in any other error type across the 
conditions (all χ2<1.0). 
 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of each type of errors made by FK in three conditions of 
Experiment 1 
 
2.2.4 Discussion 
We examined the effect of having semantically related and unrelated distractors on 
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everyday life tasks. We reasoned that the presence of semantically related distractors 
would increase the competition for selecting the appropriate target objects for 
selection (Moores et al., 2003). Under these circumstances, there may be fewer 
resources available to support other aspects of task performance, and performance 
may decline. We found that FK was worse than 4 older control patients, who did not 
present with clinical aspects of ADS (and even though two controls reported being 
relatively unpractised with two tasks). Moreover, the number of errors made overall 
by FK increased in the related condition compared with the basic condition, when 
there were no distractors present. Performance when there were unrelated distractors 
present fell in-between. On top of this, FK made relatively more step omissions when 
related distractors were present (comprising 57% of the errors in this condition, 
compared with 33% with unrelated distractors). This increased number of step 
omissions was not due to FK carrying out critical steps in the tasks using a related 
distractor instead of a target object – this was done on only one occasion. Rather a 
step tended to be completely omitted. In Experiment 2 we examined whether this 
result could be simulated in normal, young participants when they performed the task 
under the load of a secondary task. Does an increased cognitive load increase 
omission errors, in particular, when related objects are present? 
 
 
2.3 Experiment 2: Control performance under dual-task condition 
Experiment 2 assessed the role of general resource capacity in everyday actions 
directly by evaluating the performance of control participants when they performed 
the tasks under load conditions.  The ‘non-specific cognitive resources’ account 
predicts that, as tasks become more difficult, the participant should make an 
increasing number of errors (Schwartz et al., 1998). This is consistent with action 
errors in everyday life being noted under conditions of distraction (see Reason 1984) 
and with errors in everyday life tasks increasing when secondary tasks are introduced 
(Humphreys et al., 2000). However, how secondary task effects interact with the 
‘load’ introduced by adding semantically related distractors to the tasks has not been 
examined. This was tested here. In order to load working memory two groups of 
controls carried out everyday actions with two types of secondary task (easy and 
hard). The hard task was a form of the Trails test (Heaton et al., 1991) in which 
participants were given a pair of numbers (e.g. “2-45”) at the start of each trial and 
then prompted at regular intervals to shift the sequence by increasing the first number 
and decreasing the second (e.g. “2-453-444-435-42, etc.). In the easy task the 
participants had to say the word ‘the’ each time they were prompted. While some 
errors may emerge with the easy secondary task, errors should increase when the 
secondary task is hard. If this mimics the data from FK, then errors should increase 
differentially in the hard conditions when semantically related distractors are present, 
and this should be particularly the case for omission errors. 
 
2.3.1 Method 
 Participants  
In order not to repeat the tasks across participants, the conditions were manipulated 
between-subjects. Sixteen participants (age mean = 45; 5 male and 11 female) 
undertook the hard secondary task (adapted Trails test) with related distractors 
present; 15 participants (age mean = 36; 8 male and 7 female) the hard secondary task 
with unrelated distractors present; 9 participants (age mean = 35; 3 male and 6 
female) the easy secondary task with related distractors and 8 participants (age mean 
= 49; 4 male and 4 female) the easy secondary task with unrelated distractors. All the 
participants had an education level of at least 12 years. The controls were volunteers 
who agreed to help provide background data for neuropsychological studies of the 
effects of stroke on cognition. All were in current employment with jobs ranging from 
cleaners and secretaries through to teachers and office workers. 
 
 2.3.2 Procedure 
Participants performed the tea, sandwich, gift and card tasks, with the tasks 
administered in a random order to each participant within a single session. As they 
performed the task, the experimenter tapped the table every 3 seconds and the 
participant then had to make an utterance out loud, which was noted. All actions were 
videotaped for later scoring. In the hard secondary task condition (the adapted trails 
test), participants were given a pair of numbers (e.g. “2-45”) at the start of each trial 
and they had to shift the numbers in each pair in opposite directions in sequence (e.g. 
“3-44”→ “4-43”→ “5-42”, etc.). In the easy secondary task condition, they had to 
utter the word ‘the’ at each prompt. 
  
Error scores 
Action errors were scored using the action coding system (ACS) developed by 
Schwartz et al. (1991). In the hard secondary task condition, number errors were 
scored according to the first error that occurred. However, if on the next trial the 
subject carried on with the incorrect sequence but this was ‘locally’ correct (e.g. if the 
sequence was 8- 44 → 7- 43 → 6- 44 → 5-45, etc.) then only the first response (7-43) 
was taken as an error.  
2.3.4 Results 
 Number of action errors 
The number of action errors was analyzed in a two-factor independent measure 
ANOVA with the factors being distractor relatedness and difficulty of the secondary 
task. There was a reliable effect of secondary task difficulty (F (1,44)=15.51, 
p<0.001); more errors were made when the secondary task was more difficult. There 
was no effect of relatedness (F (1,44)=1.05, p=0.314, and no interaction (F<1.0). The 
mean numbers of errors summed across the tasks are shown in Figure 6.  
    
 
Figure 6: The mean number of action errors made by the controls in Experiment 
2 
Errors on the secondary tasks were also analyzed. For the difficult secondary 
task there was no effect of relatedness (t<1.0). The mean of errors in counting 
numbers in the difficult secondary task was 1.4 ± 0.8 in the related condition and 1.5 
± 0.9 in the unrelated condition.  There was a significant positive correlation between 
the number of errors when performing the tasks and the number of errors in the 
secondary task; rho = 0.236, N = 124, p = 0.008, two-tailed. There were too few 
errors in the easy secondary task for the data to be analyzed.  
More errors tended to occur in the tea task (mean 5.69 errors across 
participants, summed across the conditions), followed by the card task (mean 2.61), 
the sandwich (mean 2.15) and the gift task (1.18).  
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Error analyses 
There were too few data for both the difficult and easy versions of the secondary task 
for the different error types to be analysed by participants (see Figure 6). Instead the 
data were analysed using Log Linear analyses summing the different error types 
across participants. Of primary interest in these analyses is whether there was an 
interaction between the main conditions (ease of secondary task, presence of related 
distractors) and the relative proportions of a given error type (e.g., omission errors) 
relative to the total errors. Such an interaction would indicate that the proportion of 
one type of error, relative to the total error rate, changed across the conditions.  
For omission errors there was no interaction between the proportion of 
omission to all errors as a function of either the effect of secondary task difficulty or 
relatedness. Omissions accounted for 24% of the errors when related distractors were 
present relative to 32% when unrelated distractors were present. There was a non-
significant trend for omissions errors to increase when the secondary task was more 
difficult (29% of the errors with a difficult secondary task vs. 20% with an easy 
secondary task). For sequence errors, however, the best fitting model included an 
interaction between secondary task difficulty and error type (number of sequence to 
other errors) (χ2 (3)=1.22, p=0.748, for the best fitting model). There were 
proportionately more sequence errors when the secondary task was easy than when it 
was difficult (68% of the errors with an easy secondary task vs. 30.4% with a difficult 
secondary task). There were too few other types of error for meaningful analysis. 
 
Figure 7: Number of each type of error for control participants in the different 
task conditions. 
As well as evaluating the different error types, we also assessed the number of 
‘self-correction’ responses, generated when participants moved towards or touched an 
object that was inappropriate to the required action. The best fitting model here 
included an interaction between the difficulty of the secondary task and the number of 
self-corrected responses relative to the total errors made (χ2 (3)=8.61, p=0.07). There 
were proportionately more self-correction responses when the secondary task was 
easy relative to when it was difficult (19% self-correct responses to errors with a 
difficult secondary task vs. 56% self-correct responses to errors in the easy secondary 
task). There was no effect of relatedness (21% self-corrected responses to errors with 
related distractors vs. 29% with unrelated distractors) 
 
2.4 General Discussion 
We examined the effects of having related distractors present on the performance of 
everyday actions by a patient with clinically defined ADS (Experiment 1) and control 
participants operating under conditions of task load (Experiment 2). The ADS patient, 
FK, tended to make more errors overall when related distractors were present, and, in 
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particular, there were increases in the proportions of omission errors. The relatively 
high numbers of omission errors made by FK fits with prior data on everyday actions 
in brain lesioned patients (Schwartz et al., 1998), a result that has been interpreted in 
terms of patients lacking sufficient cognitive resources to support task performance. 
For example, without sufficient resources, patients may be unable to keep activated all 
of the sub-steps in a complex task, so that occasionally some steps ‘drop out’ of the 
sequence of actions. When related distractors are present, the attentional demands on 
selecting the appropriate target are increased (Moores et al., 2003). The data suggest 
that FK was vulnerable to this increased competition, and was less able to 
maintain/activate all of the steps for the tasks when targets had to be selected amongst 
related distractors. The result was that omission errors, in particular, increased. 
These proposals were explored further in Experiment 2 where we examined 
the effects of secondary task difficulty on everyday task performance by normal 
participants. There were clear effects of the difficulty of the secondary task, with the 
more difficult secondary task increasing the overall error rate, however they did not 
produce a similar error rate to FK.   Also, unlike the results with FK, dual-tasks did 
not selectively increase the proportion of omission errors. Though it is possible that a 
higher proportion of omission errors might have been seen if the error rate had been 
higher, the data suggest that there may be a qualitative shift in performance, with the 
controls showing no effects of distractor relatedness on performance even under the 
difficult dual-task conditions. There were decreases in the number of self-correcting 
actions made, though, when the secondary task was more difficult. 
The present results indicate a contrast between, on the one hand, the particular 
effects of relatedness on omission errors in FK, and, on the other, the lack of 
relatedness effects and the across-the-board effects of secondary task load on controls. 
This contrast may be explained if FK’s brain lesion affects particular aspects of task 
performance more than others (rather than there being an across-the-board decrease in 
function). Previous results suggest that FK has abnormal difficulty in selecting 
between semantically related stimuli (see Humphreys & Forde, 2005), and this might 
make the task of selecting between target objects and related distractors particularly 
demanding in his case (even though FK could point to and name all the objects we 
presented). In addition to this, FK has difficulty in activating/ maintaining all of the 
steps required for a given task (Forde & Humphreys, 2002; Forde, Humphreys & 
Remoundou, 2004) a deficit, which may more generally characterize patients with 
ADS. The consequences of these two particular problems are that, when extra 
resources are required by FK to select targets (amongst related distractors), there is an 
increase in omission errors because there is reduced activation of all the steps required 
to complete the task. 
In contrast to FK, normal participants suffered fewer demands when required 
to select between targets and related distractors. Furthermore, normal participants may 
have sufficient resources to activate all the steps in everyday tasks, but, under high 
load conditions, there is reduced allocation of resources to all processes involved in 
the tasks. The consequence is a general increase in errors, rather than a particular 
increase in omissions. The only evidence for a selective effect of load with controls 
was that self-correcting responses reduced as the load increased. This suggests that 
conditions of high load may disrupt the ability to monitor actions and to respond to 
conflict between different goals for action. Error monitoring, along with responding to 
conflicting information, has been associated with frontal lobe activity in studies of 
functional brain imaging (e.g., Botvinick, 2007). The more difficult secondary task in 
this study placed a demand on ‘executive’ processes also associated with frontal lobe 
function, including maintaining information while other processing was ongoing and 
shifting the task rules (from addition to subtraction and vice versa). The reduction in 
self-correction responses may reflect the common demand for frontal structures from 
error monitoring and executive-demanding secondary task processes. Even so, the 
present results indicate that any ‘general’ effects of task load, or any specific effects 
on some executive processes (error monitoring and responding to response conflict), 
are not sufficient to mimic some specific deficits in ADS patients. In patients such as 
FK there are specific deficits that generate problems in carrying out all the steps in 
tasks (leading to omission errors); these deficits can increase under load conditions 
(here, when related distractors are present), but the load effects apparent in such 
patients differ from the load effects generated through imposing demanding executive 
tasks on control participants. This points to at least some ADS patients having a 
deficit in which there is a differential effect of load on a process that is relatively 
undemanding in normal participants (e.g., maintaining the identity and order of steps 
in an everyday life task). 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Task schema and task demands in Action 
Disorganisation Syndrome 
 
 
 
Abstract 
     The role of task schema and context on the performance of everyday life tasks was 
examined in two patients with Action Disorganisation Syndrome (ADS). In 
Experiment 1 the patients had either to carry out 4 everyday life tasks or they had to 
instruct the examiner how to perform the tasks. Omission and sequence errors 
decreased when the patients instructed the examiner. In Experiment 2 the requirement 
to use a task schema was lessened by giving verbal instructions for the task steps, and 
in Experiment 3 the demands on error monitoring were reduced by both instructing 
the actions and giving the patients feedback when errors occurred. In Experiment 4 
the patients were given instructions to perform the same actions as before, but out of 
the task context. The data indicate that ADS patients can maintain a schema for 
everyday life tasks, but fail to implement their schema when having to perform 
actions in the context of monitoring for errors and over-ruling prior actions from the 
same task. The implications for understanding ADS are discussed. 
3.1 Introduction 
The performance of everyday tasks depends on a range of cognitive processes 
including the retrieval of stored knowledge about the task steps and their order, the 
ability to maintain completed and future steps in memory, the ability to over-rule 
already activated actions, and the ability to execute the correct actions, once selected 
(see Cooper, 2002; Humphreys & Forde, 1998). Following brain lesion patients may 
have difficulties in performing everyday tasks for a number of reasons including: loss 
of specific knowledge about the tasks, an inability to maintain and/or over-rule 
actions for already completed steps, poor error monitoring or an inability to order the 
steps in sequence (See Chapter 1 for more information) When this group of problems 
leads to performance that is outside the boundaries of that normally found the patients 
may be classed as having ‘action disorganisation syndrome’ (ADS; Schwartz, 1995).   
According to one prominent account of the disorder, ADS is associated with 
general decreases in cognitive resources, which result in patients not being able to 
draw upon and maintain all of the information required for adequate task performance 
(Schwartz, 1995). According to this ‘non-specific cognitive resource’ hypothesis, the 
performance of the patients should be facilitated by decreasing the cognitive resources 
required for the tasks. Forde and Humphreys (2002) investigated the effect of 
reducing the resources required for task performance by providing different cues as 
the actions were performed. This included giving written commands for each step the 
patient had to follow and having the patients copy steps in the task. They reported 
contrasting results in two patients. One patient showed improved performance when 
written cues were presented one at a time, suggesting that reducing the burden of 
retrieving each action alleviated performance. However, this approach was not 
successful in a second case, who continued to make errors indicating that, in this 
instance, alleviating poor retrieval of stored knowledge about the task steps was 
insufficient to generate correct performance. This in turn suggests additional aspects 
of task performance can play a critical role in ADS, such as inhibiting already 
completed actions. In terms of models of everyday action, these additional deficits 
can be characterised as problems not  only in patients’ having sufficient resources to 
activate stored schema for actions (Humphreys & Forde, 1998) or to activate the 
‘Contention Scheduling System’ in models such as Norman and Shallice (1986), but 
also in executive processes required to hold task steps and to monitor both when 
actions are completed and when errors might be arising (e.g., a deficit in the 
Supervisory Attentional System, in Norman and Shallice’s, 1986, terms).  In such 
cases, additional rehabilitation procedures may need to be overcome the deficit. 
However, in Forde and Humphreys’s study it is not clear how much the patients 
comprehended the steps being read (performance given each step alone was not 
tested), and it is not clear how much attention was given to each task step by each 
patient.  
The aim of the present study was to take these results further by examining 
whether (i) ADS patients have at least partial knowledge of task schema, assessed by 
having them instruct another person how to perform everyday tasks, and (ii) whether 
the demands of retrieving the schema, having to monitor for errors and having to 
over-rule actions in the task context all contribute to the patients’ deficits. Four 
experiments were conducted. Experiment 1 was carried out to test if the patients did 
have intact knowledge of the steps making up everyday-life tasks, even when they did 
not have to perform the actions themselves (the task was to instruct the experimenter 
how to carry out the task). In this experiment, the patients do not have to monitor for 
errors (since the experimenter did not make errors in executing the instruction) and, in 
addition, the need to inhibit their prior action is minimised (since the patients do not 
perform the actions). Performance when instructing the experimenter was tested 
against a ‘standard’ condition, where the patients were simply asked to perform the 
tasks. This standard condition provides a baseline for diagnosing the patients as 
having ADS. Does relieving the patients of the need to monitor errors and to inhibit 
prior actions improve performance, when actions remain dependent on retrieval of the 
stored knowledge of the task? In Experiments 2-4, the requirement to retrieve the task 
schema was reduced by giving the patients instructions to the actions required for 
successful task performance. In Experiment 2, the patients were given consecutive 
verbal instructions for each task step. In Experiment 3 they were given the same 
instructions, but this time they were given feedback on whether they made an error. 
The idea here was to reduce the need for the patients to monitor their own 
performance while completing the tasks. Did reducing the load on error monitoring 
improve task performance? Experiment 4 was a control study in which the patients 
were given the same verbal instructions as before, but the instructions for each of 4 
tasks were given in a pseudo-random order so that consecutive instructions did not 
come from the same task. This assessed whether the patients were able to recognise 
the objects and to carry out each task step when they did not have such strong 
demands to inhibit the prior step (which would still be related to the ongoing task 
when the steps were carried out consecutively, in Experiments 2 and 3, but not in 
Experiment 4).  The results highlight the impact of different task demands on ADS. In 
the General Discussion we highlight the implications for understanding the disorder. 
 
 
3.2 Patients and Controls 
Performance was assessed in two patients (FK and BL). BL was 80 years old 
at the time of testing. She was a former General Practitioner who suffered a stroke in 
1998, which affected her right middle occipital gyrus, extending in to inferior 
occipital gyrus (see Figure 8). She presented with a number of neuropsychological 
deficits including alexia (18/26 even on identifying single letters; 0 reading of 20 HF 
concrete, short words) and object recognition. (see Table 6 for more information). On 
other neuropsychological tests BL had some problems with executive function tasks, 
having an error score of 21 on the Brixton test of non-verbal executive function 
(finding a rule and rule shifting; a score of 26 indicates a clinical impairments; 
Burgess & Shallice, 1997). She had a Corsi block span of 3 and a digit span of 4 
(forwards). Background neuropsychological data on FK were reported in Chapter 2.  
Although both patients had impaired visual object recognition it is unlikely 
that this was critical here given that Experiment 4 demonstrated that the patients were 
able to carry out the instructions for single actions with the objects from the everyday 
life tasks. FK has previously been reported in several papers focusing on ADS (e.g., 
Humphreys & Forde, 1998). 
 
 
Figure 8: BL's MRI Scan 
 
The procedure of the standard condition for both patients was the same as 
Experiment 1 in Chapter 2. The tasks were: (i) make a cup of tea with two sugars and 
milk (the Tea task); (ii) make a cheese sandwich and put it in a sandwich bag (the, 
Sandwich task); (iii) wrap a present (the Gift task), and (iv) prepare a postcard for the 
post (the Card task). The patients’ performance was compared with two sets of 
control data – using results from 4 ‘control’ patients, all of whom had brain lesions 
but did not show signs of ADS (see Table 1, Chapter 2 for details of the patient 
controls), and a group of 16 non-brain lesioned young control participants. The tasks 
for the ADS patients were conducted under easier conditions than those used for the 
control participants. The control patients carried out the tasks with the objects from 
two related tasks being on the table together (tea + sandwich and gift + card). The 
controls non-lesioned carried out the tasks while performing a difficult secondary task 
comprising a form of the Trails test (Heaton et al., 1991). Participants were given a 
pair of numbers (e.g. “2-45”) at the start of each trial and then prompted at regular 
intervals to shift the sequence by increasing the first number and decreasing the 
second (e.g. “2-453-444-435-42, etc.). They did this while completing the 
steps for the secondary tasks. Impaired performance by FK and BL here, relative to 
each set of control data collected under less optimal conditions, would indicate the 
clinical impairment apparent in the ADS patients. 
 
3.3 Experiment 1: Instructing the examiner 
3.3.1 Method 
The examiner sat in front of the patient, next to a table with all objects, which were 
required for performing the specific task (see Appendix A for a list of all the objects 
and the steps required for the tasks). There were 4 tasks: making a cup of tea with 
milk and two sugars; make a cheese sandwich and place it in a sandwich bag; wrap a 
gift, and prepare a postcard for the post. Each patient was asked to give step-by-step 
commands for the examiner to complete the task. The examiner completed each 
instruction correctly. Performance was videotaped and scored according to the action 
coding system (ACS) developed by Schwartz et al. (1991). The steps to complete the 
task were taken as the common set produced by the non-lesioned control participants 
(these same steps in the same order for 80% + of the controls). On a subsequent test 
occasion, the patients were given the same arrays of objects and asked to carry out the 
everyday tasks.  
3.3.2 Results 
Number of errors 
The numbers of errors made by FK and BL are given in Table 4. The data were 
analyzed in a mixed design ANOVA with condition (standard action vs. instruction) as 
a within-subjects factor and patient as a between-subject factor (with tasks treated as 
subjects1
The control patients made on average 3.5 errors (SD 0.15) and the non-
lesioned controls made on average 1.2 errors (SD 0.15). The errors made by FK and 
BL in the standard tasks were more than 2SDs greater than the errors made by each 
set of controls, confirming the diagnosis of ADS. The errors generated by FK and BL 
even when just giving the task instructions remained more than 2SDs from the errors 
produced by the controls carrying out the tasks under more taxing conditions.   
). The difference between the conditions was not reliable, F (1, 6) = 2.78, p = 
0.15. There was no overall difference between the patients and no interaction of 
condition and patient (both F<1.0). 
                                                 
1 I should note that violation of the assumption of subjects as independent data source might lead to 
Type 1 errors (that is to say; repeating different tasks with the same person is not the same as a set of 
independent observations on different subjects). 
Table 4: Number of errors made by the patients 
   Tasks    
           
Patients Conditions in order Tea Sandwich Gift Card Total 
       
  Standard (Expt. 1) 6 2 4 3 15 
 Command (Expt.1) 2 1 0 5 8 
FK Cue (Expt. 2) 3 0 3 1 7 
  
Cue+feedback 
(Expt. 3) 2 3 1 1 7 
  
Cue, random order 
(Expt. 4) 1 0 0 2 3 
       
  Standard (Expt. 1) 8 1 2 3 14 
 Command(Expt. 1) 1 0 3 2 6 
BL Cue (Expt. 2) 2 2 1 2 7 
  
Cue+feedback 
(Expt. 3) 1 0 1 0 2 
  
Cue, random order 
(Expt. 4) 1 0 0 1 2 
 
Accomplishment  
Accomplishment scores were based on whether a given step in the task was 
accomplished, irrespective of the order of the steps. FK correctly generated 8/27 steps 
in the standard condition and 10/27 steps when he gave instructions; BL accomplished 
11/27 in the standard action condition and 15/27 steps when she gave instructions. 
The mean steps accomplished by the lesioned controls was 25 (SD 1) and by the non-
lesioned controls 27 (SD 2.2). Both FK and BL were clearly impaired relative to the 
controls, in both conditions. The differences between the steps accomplished in the 
standard conditions and the instruction conditions were not reliable (χ2<1.0).  
Type of errors 
Table 5 documents the types of errors made by the patients. In the standard condition, 
the majority of errors made by both patients were omission and sequence errors, 
though BL also made some quality/spatial errors (e.g., cutting up too small a piece of 
paper when wrapping the gift). When the patients instructed the examiner to perform 
the tasks, omission and sequence errors decreased. The data were analyzed using a 3 
factor Log Linear analysis with the factors being patient (FK vs. BL), condition 
(standard vs. command) and accuracy (number correct vs. number errors). The best 
fitting model (χ2 (4)=1.92, p=0.75) was based on a single interaction between 
condition and accuracy (χ2(1)=4.99, p<0.025). There was a relative decrease in 
omission and sequence errors when the patients instructed the examiner.  
Table 5: The number of each type of errors across the different conditions 
 %Type of error 
Standard 
(Expt. 1) 
 
 
 
 
Command 
(Expt. 1) 
Cue 
(Expt. 2) 
 
 
Cue 
+Feedback 
(Expt. 3) 
Cue, 
random 
order 
(Expt. 4) Total/type 
 Semantic 0 0 1 1 0 2 
 Addition 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 Omission 7 2 2 3 0 14 
FK Sequence 5 1 0 2 0 8 
 Perseveration 1 0 1 1 0 3 
 Quality/Spatial 1 2 3 0 2 8 
 Toying 1 1 1 0 1 4 
  Total/condition 15 7 8 7 3 40 
 
 Semantic 0 
0 
0 0 0 0 
 Addition 0 1 0 1 1 3 
 Omission 7 2 2 2 0 13 
 Sequence 1 1 2 0 0 4 
BL Perseveration 1 1 2 0 0 4 
 Quality/Spatial 5 0 1 0 1 7 
 Toying 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Total/condition 14 5 7 3 2 31 
               
         
 
 3.3.3 Discussion 
Both patients made more errors and accomplished fewer steps than did control 
participants, even though FK and BL here carried out the tasks under ‘standard’ 
conditions (with just the objects for the tasks present and with no dual task load) 
while the controls performed the tasks under less optimal circumstances (with 
distractor objects present and with a dual task load). These data indicate that FK and 
BL can both be classed as having ADS. Interestingly the patients performed relatively 
well when asked to instruct the examiner to carry out the tasks, and, in this command 
condition, there was a reliable decrease in the proportion of omission and sequential 
errors. These results indicate that loss of the schema for the everyday actions may not 
be a major component behind the patients failing to perform the actions correctly – 
rather the patients may be detrimentally affected by ancillary factors that become 
critical when they have to perform the tasks themselves. For example, the requirement 
to carry out the actions may demand resources, and there may also be demands due to 
having to inhibit actions within the tasks that have just been completed or to 
monitoring for errors when performing the actions. The net result of these increased 
demands may be that the task schema no longer remains so strongly activated, and 
omission and sequence errors result. 
Humphreys and Forde (1998) also presented some evidence consistent with 
aspects of the schema for tasks still be present for patient FK. They instructed FK to 
carry out simple actions that contravened the standard action that might be involved in 
an everyday task (e.g., put the saucer on the cup, rather than put the cup on the 
saucer). They found that FK made many errors by carrying out the standard action 
(putting the cup on the saucer), even though he was typically able to repeat back the 
instruction.  In such cases, performance seemed to be driven by activation of the 
standard actions. In addition, Bickerton, Humphreys and Riddoch (2007) found that 
ADS patients were likely to omit actions with unusual exemplars of objects, but only 
when the actions were conducted within the context of the everyday tasks. When 
instructed to perform single actions, the patients used the unusual objects 
successfully. Here the schema for the everyday task seemed to ‘drive’ the patients to 
use standard/prototypical objects, suggesting that the schema still had some influence 
on task performance.  The present study provides more direct evidence for task 
schema still being present in such patients, though they seem impaired in using it 
when they have to implement everyday tasks. The reasons why the patients are 
impaired were examined further in Experiments 2-4. Experiment 2 reduced the need 
to retrieve the task schema by giving the patients one instruction at a time, while 
Experiment 3 did this while also reducing the requirement for error monitoring by 
giving the patients immediate feedback when they made errors. Experiment 4 tested 
whether having the patients perform single actions outside the context of the task 
(randomising the order of instructions across tasks) improved performance.  
 
3.4. Experiment 2: Verbal cues to action 
Experiment 2 tested if patients could successfully complete everyday tasks when they 
did not have to depend on their stored knowledge of the component actions or their 
knowledge of the temporal order of the actions, but when all the steps were 
nevertheless required and all the objects present before the patients. Verbal cues to 
action may bypass the requirements to access stored knowledge of schema and could 
consequently facilitate performance on the everyday tasks, if use of the schema is 
problematic. Some evidence for verbal cueing has been reported by Bickerton, 
Humphreys, and Riddoch (2006), who also worked with patient FK. Bickerton et al. 
taught FK a verbal ‘poem’, which included the instructions for an everyday task. FK’s 
performance improved under conditions where he could remember the poem and used 
the poem to verbally cue his actions. We evaluated whether external instructions, 
given by the examiner, might also be effective here.  
 
3.4.1 Method 
The Method was the same as for the standard condition examined in Experiment 1, 
with the sole difference being that the examiner read out to each patient each 
consecutive instruction. The patient was then asked to perform the instruction. 
 
3.4.2 Results 
Number of errors 
The numbers of errors produced by each patient when they performed the tasks are 
shown in Table 4. The data were analyzed using a mixed-design ANOVA. Patients 
were included as a between-subject factor, conditions as a within-subject factor and 
the tasks as subjects. Performance in the verbal cue condition was compared with that 
in the standard condition (Experiment 1). There tended to be fewer errors overall after 
the patients received a cue, compared with the standard condition, F (1,6) = 5.87, p = 
.052. There was no overall difference between the patients and no interaction between 
patient and cue (F <1).   
 
Accomplishment score 
FK accomplished 14/27 steps of tasks in the verbal cue condition. FK tended to 
accomplish more steps following a verbal cue (χ2 (1)= 2.20, p=0.14). BL completed 
18/27 steps of the tasks under both the instruction and the standard conditions.   
 
Type of errors 
Table 5 gives the number of each type of error made by FK and BL in each condition.  
The data were analyzed by treating the different error types separately.   
Conditions was treated as a within subject factor and patients as a between subject 
factor, with each task treated as a separate subject. Omission errors significantly 
decreased in the verbal cue condition (F (1, 6) = 21.43, p= .004); there was no effect 
of patient (F <1). The effect of the verbal cue on other error types was not reliable, for 
either patient. 
 
3.4.4 Discussion 
Giving the patients a verbal instruction for each task step tended to improve their 
performance, compared with when the tasks were performed in the basic condition, 
without instruction. Overall the patients made fewer errors and FK accomplished a 
greater number of steps. Omission errors decreased across both patients. The data are 
consistent with the patients encountering problems in everyday life tasks when they 
depend on using a self-generated schema for task accomplishment, so that they 
improve when task schema are provided externally (by giving instruction). However, 
even when the task instructions were provided, the patients still made more errors 
than is apparent when controls perform the same tasks (see Experiment 1). In 
addition, while the verbal cue tended to reduce omission errors, it did not affect some 
of the other types of error that characterize the patients’ performance (e.g., 
perseverations). These additional errors may reflect a tendency by the patients to be 
driven in a bottom-up manner to the objects present in front of them, when the task 
schema is partially activated and/or when an earlier action is activated – in which case 
they may carry out a step that is highly activated but which either repeats an earlier 
action (generating a perseverative error) or which occurs out of sequence (generating 
a sequence error). Such errors may arise due to poor modulation of task performance 
by executive/supervisory attentional processes (cf. Norman & Shallice, 1986), which 
fail to modulate activation driven by the task context.  In Experiment 3 an attempt 
was made to reduce the load on executive processes specifically by providing direct 
feedback to patients when they performed the actions for everyday tasks, so that the 
requirement for error monitoring decreased. Does this additionally improve 
performance by reducing the sequence and perseverative errors apparent even when 
task instructions are given (in Experiment 2)? 
 
3.5 Experiment 3: Effects of error feedback 
In addition to any problem relating to schema knowledge, ADS patients may have 
problems in the internal monitoring of their performance through executive control 
processes/the supervisory attentional system (Humphreys & Forde, 1998; Miltner, 
Braun, & Coles, 1997; Norman & Shallice, 1986). At least one demand on attentional 
processes during the performance of everyday tasks is the requirement to monitor for 
errors. In a study of the effects of secondary tasks on the performance of normal 
participants, Humphreys, Francis and Forde (2002) noted that control participants 
increased the number of mis-selection errors – where they made an action towards an 
object that was inappropriate for the given stage of the task – but then self-corrected 
their behaviour, stopping before implementing the action. In such cases, potential 
action errors may be activated, but a monitoring process limits their effect on 
performance. In patients with ADS, though, action errors are typically carried out and 
the patients may show little awareness of the error occurring. Thus patient BL here 
made errors by omitting the tea in the tea-making task, but showed no sign of 
disappointment when the ‘tea’ she produced was white.  In Experiment 3 we sought to 
reduce the requirement of self-monitoring by giving feedback (as a external 
monitoring source) after each action. As in Experiment 2 each action was instructed, 
however if the action was performed correctly or if an error occurred then the patient 
was told this immediately.  Thus, in this task we reduced not only the need to use 
stored knowledge of the actions and their order, but also the need for supervisory 
attention system in monitoring the actions to minimize errors. 
 
3.5.1 Method  
Patients were given positive and negative feedback of their actions additionally, step-
by-step verbal commands. For example, in a wrong order action or in performing 
incorrectly, they were told that the action performance was not correct and they were 
given the command one more time. If patients after this still made the same error, they 
were allowed to carry on the task. In the correct action they were given positive 
feedback such as “that’s excellent”. In all other respects the method matched that in 
Experiment 2. 
 
3.5.2 Results 
Number of errors 
A repeated measures ANOVA design was used to analyze data. We considered 
patients a between subject-factor, conditions as the within subject factor and tasks as 
subjects. The results showed a reliable main effect of condition; F (1, 6) = 7.89, p = 
.031, but no significant difference in error numbers between patients and no 
interaction (both F<1). 
 
Accomplishment 
Relative to the standard condition, both patients significantly improved their 
accomplishment score. FK now accomplished 21/27 steps and BL 27/27 (χ2 (1) 
=12.59 and Fisher exact probability p=0.0001 respectively).   
 
Type of error 
The majority of FK’s error types were step omissions, although he made some 
sequence, perseveration, and semantic errors. BL only produced two errors (one 
omission and one addition). The data were analyzed in a mixed design ANOVA, with 
patients as the between-subject factor, condition (standard vs. Experiment 3) as the 
within-subject factor, and tasks as subjects. There was a significant decrease in the 
number of omission errors in the cue + feedback condition compared with the 
standard condition (F (1, 6) = 81, p < 0.001) and also in the number of quality/spatial 
errors (F (1, 6) = 7.71, p < .032). In each case the two patients did not differ and there 
were no interactions with patient (all F<1.0). The number of sequence errors did not 
change across the conditions (F<1). 
3.5.3. Discussion 
Giving the patients instructions for each task along also with feedback about 
performance reduced the number of errors and increased the accomplishment of the 
actions. Under the conditions used in Experiment 3, BL improved to the level found 
in the control groups (see Experiment 1). FK, however, continued to perform worse 
than the controls, The data suggest that, when the demand of having to use self-
generated schema are reduced, along with the need for error monitoring, then the 
performance of ADS patients can improve. In the final experiment, we gave the 
patients the same instructions as in Experiments 2 and 3, but this time we used a 
pseudo-random presentation order so that we never asked a patient to perform two 
separate actions from the tasks. Would performance of the same actions be improved 
in this case, when actions were carried out outside the context of the tasks?  
 
 
3.6 Experiment 4: Single actions outside the task context 
 
3.6.1 Method 
In Experiment 4 the patients were given the same verbal instructions as before, but the 
instructions for each of 4 tasks were given in a pseudo-random order so that 
consecutive instructions did not come from the same task. 
 
3.6.2 Results  
Number of errors: The number of errors is shown in Table 4. The data were 
compared with those from Experiment 2 (same instructions, but given consecutively 
from the task) using a mixed design ANOVA with patient as a between-subjects 
factor and condition as a within-subjects factor. There was a borderline difference 
between the conditions (F(1,6)=5.65, p=0.055).   
 
Accomplishment: FK accomplished 20/27 and BL 24/27 steps. The data were 
compared with the results from Experiment 2 in a Log Linear analysis with the factors 
being patient, condition (Experiment 4 vs. Experiment 2) and accuracy (number of 
correct or error responses). This generated a best fitting model (χ2(4)=3.24, p=0.518) 
with an interaction between condition and accuracy (χ2(1)=6.52, p<0.025). There 
were more steps accomplished here than in Experiment 2, and this held across 
patients. 
 
Type of errors: Unlike previously, neither patient made omission or sequence errors, 
though some quality/spatial errors remained. This result is striking given that the 
patients made more omissions than any other type of error, when the tasks were 
performed under standard conditions. The results suggest that one source of omission 
and sequence errors is the fact that, in normal task performance, actions are 
undertaken in the context of a recently completed action with the same objects 
present, and this can disrupt performance.  
 
3.7 Discussion 
Data have been presented from 4 experiments documenting the performance of 2 
ADS patients on everyday life tasks under different conditions. Experiment 1 
compared the ability of the patients to instruct the examiner to perform the task 
compared with when the patients carried out the tasks themselves. The patients were 
better able to instruct the examiner to carry out the tasks than they were able to 
perform the tasks themselves, and there was a reduction in omission and sequence 
errors in the ‘command’ (examiner instruction) condition. This indicates that the 
patients retained some ability to retrieve appropriate task schema, and could use the 
schema when they were not themselves engaged in the everyday life tasks. In 
Experiments 2 and 3, we reduced the need to rely on a self-generated task schema by 
giving the patients sequential verbal instructions to each action in the tasks. 
Experiment 2 presented the patients with the instructions alone, while in Experiment 3 
the patients were also given feedback about the performance of each action. Again 
these conditions improved performance, highlighting that the load of having to 
retrieve and maintain a task schema could impair the performance of the patients. 
Though it is possible that repeating the tasks may cause learning, and the differences 
between the present conditions, this is unlikely. Both FK and BL had stable deficits in 
carrying out everyday tasks, and had been tested on all of the tasks used here on 
several occasions without showing any evidence of learning. Finally, in Experiment 4 
the patients were given the same instructions as before, but now consecutive 
instructions did not come from the same tasks. Interestingly there was a further 
improvement in this condition compared to when the same instructions were given 
but consecutively from each task. This last result indicates that there is a further 
disruption to the patients when consecutive actions come from the same tasks. This 
suggests that, when consecutive actions come from the same task, there is stronger 
competition for selection of the appropriate action. This might come about because 
the patients need to inhibit previously activated actions, or because there is stronger 
competition for action selection due to object-action links perhaps being activated on 
the immediately prior trial. In studies of visual search, Moores, Laiti and Chelazzi 
(2003) (see also Belke et al., 2008) have shown that normal participants can be 
affected by the presence of stimuli that are semantically related to a target that is 
being searched for. For example, search for a target ‘motorbike’ will be slowed by the 
presence of a ‘crash-helmet’. In work with patient FK (Morady & Humphreys, 2009) 
it has also been shown that the presence of related distractors disrupts task 
performance (see also Chapter 2 here). When consecutive actions are cued from the 
same task, it can be proposed that not only are related objects present before the 
participants, but those objects (and any associated actions) will also be in an activated 
state (having recently been cued), and this may create more ‘noise’ in selecting the 
appropriate object and action to take place.  
One framework for the performance of everyday action tasks was put forward 
by Humphreys and Forde (1998), who suggested that actions may be controlled 
through a ‘competitive queuing’ mechanism. In this framework, representations of 
individual actions are activated in a top-down manner by a task schema, with 
activation levels capturing the order in which actions must be output. Following the 
production of one action the action representation is temporarily inhibited, enabling 
the next action representation to be selected and the action articulated. Within this 
scheme, ADS may result from either weak top-down activation of the task schema, or 
from noise in the representations so that some actions are output in the wrong order, 
others suppressed (and omitted) and so forth. The present data suggest that patient can 
maintain some knowledge about task schema (enough to instruct the examiner to 
perform the actions, in Experiment 1). This does not mean that the schema is correctly 
maintained within the competitive queuing system, however, if there is noise at that 
level. The data from Experiments 2-4 further indicate that reducing the need to rely on 
a task schema, reducing the requirement for error monitoring, and reducing the noise 
from recently activated actions in the same task, all also have a positive effect on 
performance. In each case, it can be suggested that the competition to select actions 
will reduce when (i) only one action is strongly activated by the task instruction 
(Experiment 2), (ii) more resources are available to sustain any differential activation 
of action representations (e.g., by reducing the need for error monitoring, Experiment 
3), and (iii) there is less competition from objects and object-action associations that 
have been activated in the same context (Experiment 4). The results point to the 
important roles that these extra factors may play in ADS, over and above poor 
retrieval of task schema. 
The present data also have implications for the rehabilitation of ADS. The 
results indicate that taking measures to reduce the demands on processing while the 
patients perform the tasks will be useful in ensuring that the patients complete the 
tasks correctly. This fits with the work of Bickerton et al. (2006) who, as already 
noted, demonstrated that verbal cueing in the form of a poem helped patient FK 
reduce his errors in everyday tasks. The improved performance when the patients 
performed the actions out of context (Experiment 4) also suggests that it might be 
useful to start from this condition and then to gradually increase the number of actions 
from the same task, so the patients gradually re-constructs a portfolio of actions that 
comprise the task. The bottom-up chaining of actions may then help to support any 
top-down activation from task schema which may be weak and noisy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
Convergent Route Model for Action 
 
Abstract 
In this Chapter, I present evidence indicating that patients with impaired semantic 
knowledge, who show a consistent deficit with particular items, nevertheless are 
better in actually using objects than in pantomiming action. There is also no 
additional effect of object use on stimuli the patients can retrieve semantics for, 
compare with objects they fail to retrieve semantics for. The data are interpreted in 
terms of the patients benefitting from convergent activation from multiple modalities 
when using objects, which by-passes their impaired semantic knowledge. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Deficits in object recognition can occur at a variety of levels. For example, some 
patients can have perceptual impairments that are specific to one input modality, often 
due to a selective, modality-specific deficit in perception (see Humphreys & Riddoch, 
1987). In contrast, other patients can present with impaired recognition despite spared 
perceptual processing – up to and including access to stored knowledge about the 
structural properties of objects (e.g., as reflected in spared object decision when 
semantic matching is deficient; Hillis & Caramazza, 1995; Fery et al., 2003; Riddoch 
& Humphreys, 1987a; see Humphreys & Riddoch, 2006, for a review). In such cases, 
there can be a disturbance in stored semantic knowledge about objects, which affects 
recognition across different input modalities (Riddoch et al., 1988). This central 
semantic disturbance can also be characterised by the patients having a consistent 
deficit across items over different test occasions (e.g., Humphreys & Forde, 2005; see 
Warringrton & Shallice, 1979), suggesting that semantic representations for particular 
items have been lost.  
Patients with perceptual impairments in object recognition very often fail to 
show how objects might be used, when they fail at identification (Riddoch & 
Humphreys, 1987b). This is consistent with the patients failing to derive sufficient 
perceptual information to enable appropriate gestures to be generated. With patients 
with semantic loss, however, the case is less clear. For example, patients with poor 
access to semantic information about objects can nevertheless show some ability to 
gesture to the objects (Hillis & Caramazza, 1995; Riddoch & Humphreeys, 1987a), a 
result which has been interpreted as indicating that there can be direct access to action 
representations that by-passes any impairment in accessing semantic knowledge. In 
such ‘direct route’ accounts of action, it is supposed that either perceptual properties 
of objects are derived by the patients, or there is access to stored perceptual 
representations for objects, which in turn activate action routines, so that appropriate 
actions are made (e.g., Riddoch, Humphreys & Price, 1989; Yoon, Heinke & 
Humphreys, 2002).  
Although there is evidence for direct access to action in such patients, the 
factors that determine whether or not actions are correctly carried out have not been 
clearly specified. In the field of apraxia, one standard finding is that patients show 
better use of objects when they are allowed to hold the stimuli when acting, compared 
with when the patients are asked to pantomime the action (see Chainay & 
Humphreys, 2002; Chainay and Humphreys, 2002) examined why this was the case. 
They noted that one possible reason for better use than pantomime is that the patients 
may better recognize the objects when they are held, when there is joint input from 
touch as well as vision. However, the ‘use advantage’ remained for objects that were 
identified, so that the improvement could not be due to better access to semantics, 
since semantic access was achieved in such cases. Chainay and Humphreys 
consequently proposed that the ‘use advantage’ arose because of direct activation of 
action representations from the multiple modalities, based on what they termed a 
‘convergent activation’ model. According to this model, the direct perceptual input 
converges on action representations to ‘push’ those representations into a state that 
supports retrieval of the correct action. This can enable patients to overcome a deficit 
in activating action representations from semantic knowledge. An alternative proposal 
is that pantomiming might be more difficult than ‘object use’ because action gesturing 
makes more cognitive demands compared to actual tool-use. Any decrease in 
performance with extra cognitive demand might exacerbate a deficit even if the 
objects can be identified.  
Chainay and Humphreys (2002) examined the ‘use advantage’ for stimuli that 
could be identified. The present study examined the converse case, namely whether 
there is a ‘use advantage’ for items that cannot be identified due to patients having 
impaired semantic representations for stimuli. To assess this, object use was compared 
with pantomimed actions for two patients with impaired object recognition due to 
semantic loss. If there is semantic loss, found across multiple modalities, then the 
object use effect should not stem from improved recognition (indeed, see Chapter 5 
here for evidence that recognition may be driven by the action stimulated from the 
extra perceptual input, in such cases). Instead, the use advantage may follow from 
multiple perceptual inputs constraining action retrieval.   
  
4.2 Method 
Case reports: Two participants were tested: FK (see Chapter 2 for more details) and 
BL (see Chapter 3 for full details). Table 6 provides scores on a range of standardised 
tests of object processing. Perceptual processing from both vision and touch was 
relatively spared (e.g., judged from his ability to match objects across different 
views), however FK showed impaired semantic access, his performance fell well 
outside the control range when performance depended on access to semantic 
knowledge to enable judgments to be made. Prior testing demonstrated item-specific 
consistency (confirmed in the present data-set too). This is indicative of a central 
deficit in semantic knowledge (Humphreys and Forde, 2005). 
 In BL– Similarly to FK– there appeared to be relatively good perceptual 
processing from both vision and touch, along with impaired access to semantic 
knowledge.  
  
 
Table 6: Performance of standardized tests of object processing (impaired scores 
in bold) 
Neuropsychological test FK BL Controls – mean (SD) 
Copying simple shapes from (BORB) Spared Spared N/A 
Foreshortened matches  (BORB) 22/25 22/25 21.6(2.6) 
Minimal-feature matches (BORB) 24/25 22/25 23.3 (2.0) 
Associative matches (BORB) 20 17 27.5 (2.4) 
Pyramids & Palm Trees (Pictures) 36/52 34/52 50/52 
Pyramids & Palm Trees (Auditory words) 37/52 40/52 50/52 
PALPA picture-auditory word match (test 39) 29/40 29/40 39.24 (.07) 
PALPA auditory synonym matches (test 49) 32/60 33/60 60 
BORB = Birmingham Object Recognition Battery (Riddoch & Humphreys, 1993) 
Pyramids & Palm Trees (Howard & Patterson, 1992) 
PALPA= Psycholinguistic Assessment of Language |Processing in Aphasia (Kay, Lesser & Coltheart, 
1992) 
 
4.2.1 Tests of apraxia 
To examine the ability of both patients to act appropriately to objects they performed 
the following actions: 
1. Object use: the patients had to use the objects. For this the patients were 
allowed to both hold and see the objects  
2. Pantomime actions: the task was to pantomime transitive gestures to stimuli. 
The stimuli were presented in the following modalities: (i) vision (either as 
objects or pictures), (ii) touch, and (iii) written verbal 
3. Pantomime intransitive gestures to verbal prompts 
4. Copying both transitive and intransitive gestures 
4.2.2 Tests of semantic processing 
The ability to access semantic information about the stimuli used in the action tests 
was evaluated. For this, each  patient was presented with triplets of objects which the 
patients could both see and feel.  25 of the objects from the action task were 
designated as targets (e.g., hammer). On each trial one target was presented along 
with one extra item that was strongly associated to the target (nail) and another (the 
distractor) that belonged to the same general semantic category as the target but was 
less strongly associated to it (saw) (see Appendix C). The task was to decide which 
two stimuli were used together or were related to one another.  
Stimuli 
Forty-seven commonly used objects were used. A full list is provided in Appendix B. 
Procedure 
Each object was presented to the patients, one at a time, in different conditions.  First 
the Use task condition was presented to patients and then they performed the 
pantomime tasks. 
 
4.2.3 Transitive actions 
Use task (Task a) 
In the real use condition, patients were told: “Pick up the object and show me how 
you would use it”. 
Pantomime task (Task b) 
The orders of four conditions were: visual (object presented), visual (picture 
presented), verbal and tactile. In the visual condition with real objects, the stimuli 
were presented on the table in front of the patients who were told: “Show me how you 
would use the object placed in front of you”. In this condition the patient was not 
allowed to touch or handle the object. For the mime with pictures, the picture of each 
stimulus was presented on a paper on the table in front of the patients where it 
remained there till the action was finished. The instruction was to “Show me how you 
would use the object that you are seeing in this picture”. In the verbal condition the 
name of stimuli were presented on a paper on the table in front of the patients and the 
examiner said: “Show me how you would use a (name of object). In the tactile 
condition, patients were blindfolded, and the objects were placed in their hand and 
were told: “Show me how you would use the object in your hand”. Patients were 
allowed to handle the object for about a few seconds before giving it back to the 
examiner.  Then, patients were asked to pantomime the related action. 
Scores 
Each patient’s response was videotaped and scored subsequently as correct or 
incorrect (correct was defined as a recognisable and accurate gesture).  
In order to analyze the consistency of participants’ actions, all the conditions were 
repeated in a separate session. To provide a measure of validity of the scores, two 
independent judges scored each patient’s performance, randomly. 
 
Control subjects 
Three control participants (1 Male and 2 Females) took part in the study, 2 age-
matched to BL and 1 to FK. The controls scored at the ceiling in all tests. 
 
4.3 Results 
Accuracy  
Table 7 presents the frequency of accurate gestures made by FK and BL when 
performing the tasks in the different conditions. Differences between the conditions 
for each patient were analysed using sign tests. The consistency of each patient’s 
actions, across the two tests in each condition, was evaluated by comparing 
performance relative to the scores expected by chance, given the level of performance 
in each session (see Appendix E for scores of first and second assessment) 
Table 7: Frequency of correct scores in the patients 
Task FK BL 
Object Use (Task a) 56/94 (60%)*** 52/94 (55%)*** 
   
Pantomime (Task b)   
Transitive gestures   
Visual (object) 29/94 (31%)*** 30/94 (32%)*** 
Visual (picture) 20/94 (21%)*** 21/94 (22%)*** 
Tactile 37/94 (39%)*** 15/94 (16%)*** 
Verbal 19/94 (20%)*** 26/94 (28%)*** 
The Chi square tests are for the comparison between patient and control subjects 
*p<.05, **p<.001, ***p<.0001  
 
 
Table 7 presents the results in the different condition for each patient. The 
controls performed at ceiling. It is clear that both patients were impaired relative to 
the controls.  Both patients also showed an ‘object use advantage’, when performance 
in the ‘use’ condition was compared with that in the single modality, visual and tactile 
action conditions. For FK the ‘use’ condition was better than when he was asked to 
pantomime to visually presented objects (p = .006), to pictures (p< .0001), to tactilely 
presented objects (p= .004) and to verbally presented names (p< .0001). Similarly for 
BL there was an advantage for ‘object use’ compared with the same conditions: 
pantomime to visual objects (p= .01), to pictures (p=.001), to tactilely presented 
objects (p<.001) and to verbally presented names (p=0.01)2
There were also some differences between the patients in the pattern of 
performance across the conditions where pantomimes were required. FK’s 
pantomimed gestures were more correct in the tactile condition than in the verbal and 
. 
picture conditions (p= .014 and .007 respectively). In contrast to this, BL performed 
better in the visual object condition than in the tactile condition (p=0.17). 
Semantic matching and the ‘use advantage’ 
FK scored 13/25 and BL scored 11/25 on the semantic matching test. Neither patient 
performed above chance (all χ2<1.0). 
To assess whether the object use advantage arose irrespective of whether the 
objects were successfully recognised, the use advantage was examined for objects 
where semantic matching was correct and for objects where semantic matching was 
incorrect. The results are presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Number of correct and incorrect semantic matches (visual condition), 
with the different action conditions broken down as a function of whether 
semantic matches was correct (a) or incorrect (b) 
(a) Correct semantic matches 
Action 
condition: 
Patient Correct 
actions 
Incorrect 
actions 
χ2 analyses 
vs. object 
use 
Probability of  
difference 
occurring by 
chance 
Object use FK 
BL 
12 
 9 
1 
 2 
 
 
 
 
Object 
pantomime 
FK 
BL 
8 
5 
5 
6 
5.2 
5.86 
.025 
.025 
Picture 
pantomime 
FK 
BL 
4 
 4 
 9 
7 
23.11 
9.82 
.001 
.01 
Touch 
pantomime 
FK 
BL 
10 
3 
3 
8 
1.73 
16.5 
n.s. 
.001 
Verbal 
pantomime 
FK 
BL 
 3 
 5 
10 
6 
35.1 
5.86 
.001 
.025 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                           
2  All tests 2-tailed 
(b) Incorrect semantic matches 
Action 
condition: 
Patient Correct 
actions 
Incorrect 
actions 
χ2 analyses 
vs. object 
use 
Probability 
of  difference 
occurring by 
chance 
Object use FK 
BL 
8 
7 
 4 
7 
 
 
 
 
Object 
pantomime 
FK 
BL 
1 
4 
11 
10 
53.44 
3.51 
.001 
.08 
Picture 
pantomime 
FK 
BL 
1 
2 
11 
12 
53.44 
14.58 
.001 
.01 
Touch 
pantomime 
FK 
BL 
1 
2 
11 
12 
53.44 
14.58 
.001 
.01 
Verbal 
pantomime 
FK 
BL 
1 
1 
11 
13 
53.44 
38.76 
.001 
.01 
 
For all but two comparisons, both, FK and BL showed an ‘object use 
advantage’, and this held irrespective of whether the patients were able to make 
correct semantic matches to the particular stimuli. The data suggest that the use 
advantage held irrespective of whether semantic access for the objects was achieved. 
Action consistency 
Table 9 gives the tests of consistency carried out on the action data for each patient, 
examined the observed performance against that expected from chance consistency. 
Table 9: Consistency of action 
                                             FK                                                   BL 
 χ2 analyses vs.  
chance 
Probability of 
difference 
occurring by 
chance 
χ2 analyses vs.  
chance 
Probability of 
difference 
occurring by 
chance 
Object use 14.1 .01 
 
6.01 .05 
Object 
pantomime 
17.87 .001 4.01 .13 
Picture 
pantomime 
12.5 .01 48.16 .001 
Tactile 
Pantomime 
12.8 .01 13.23 .01 
Verbal 
pantomime 
19.6 .001 18.11 .001 
  
 With one exception (object pantomime, for BL), both patients showed item-
specific consistency which was reliably greater than could be expected by chance. 
This pattern is consistent with the actions being limited by a central representational 
deficit. Despite this, performance improved in the use compared with the pantomime 
conditions. 
 
4.4. Discussion  
The results show that there is better use of objects than action gesturing in FK and 
BL. This pattern of performance has been observed on numerous occasions in patients 
showing aspects of apraxia (e.g., Chainay & Humphreys, 2002). Chainay and 
Humphreys accounted for the result in terms of direct sensory representations (visual 
and tactile, when objects are used), helping to constrain action performance. An 
alternative is that there may simply be higher cognitive demands on the action system 
when actions must be pantomimed compared with when objects are directly used. 
Whichever the case, the interesting aspect of the present data is that both FK and BL 
have impaired object recognition, and in particular poor access to semantic 
knowledge, and this occurs across different modalities of presentation. The results 
from the semantic matching tests suggest that the patients have a central semantic 
deficit. Despite this, ‘object use advantage’ occurred both for objects that were 
matched correctly and for objects which were matched incorrectly. Given that the 
semantic matching task could use both vision and touch, it cannot be argued that the 
‘use advantage’ came about because there was improved recognition when both 
modalities were present. Instead, the results consistent with a ‘direct route’ proposal 
that input from the two modalities converges at a stage of selecting and programming 
an action to the stimulus, by-passing the recognition deficit (Chainay & Humphreys, 
2002). It is also consistent with any reduced cognitive demand on action 
programming, in the use condition, influencing performance irrespective of the 
semantic impairment in the patients. 
It is also of interest that both FK and BL by and large showed item-
consistency in their action performance – they were consistently correct at using 
certain objects and unable to use others. In the neuropsychological literature item-
specific consistency has been associated with patients having impaired representations 
of stimuli, which results in the representations not being accessible across different 
test occasions (Warrington & Shallice, 1979; Shallice, 1985). It is as if the 
representations have simply been lost from memory and cannot be retrieved – the 
degraded store account. However, if this was the case, then how could actions be 
performed correctly when the perceptual input increased, in the object use condition? 
At least two possibilities can be suggested – one of which maintains the ‘degraded 
store’ account of consistent deficits, while the other takes a different approach to 
explaining item-specific deficits.  
According to the degraded store account, the patients show item-specific 
consistency because of their semantic impairment. It may be that the semantic route to 
action is dominant, especially when perceptual input into the action system is limited. 
As a consequence the patients are impaired at acting to stimuli which have degraded 
semantic representations. Consistent with this proposal, both FK and BL were better 
at acting to stimuli that they could match correctly at a semantic level, compared to 
stimuli that were matched incorrectly (with objects matched correctly FK made 37 
correct to 75 incorrect actions; with objects matched incorrectly he made 12 correct to 
48 incorrect actions, summing across the different actions conditions; χ2 (1) =4.73, 
p<0.05. With objects matched correctly BL made 26 correct and 29 incorrect actions, 
while with objects matched incorrectly she made 16 correct actions and 54 incorrect 
actions; χ2 (1)=8.23, p<.01). However, a direct route, driven by convergent activation 
from different perceptual modalities, could enable action representations to be 
accessed even if these same representations could not be accessed semantically (due 
to impoverished semantic input).  
The alternative view is that item-consistency could occur not because 
representations are lost, but because they are fragile or easily placed into a below-
threshold state. Such ‘vulnerable’ representations may mean that actions are not easily 
accessed across two different occasions. However, if there is increased perceptual 
input, then the representations may be raised above threshold, enabling actions to be 
made correctly (see Forde & Humphreys, 1997 for similar arguments). According to 
this proposal, the patients may have impaired action representations, in addition to 
any impairment at a semantic level. These action representations may be raised above 
threshold by increased perceptual input, in the ‘use’ conditions. 
A final point to note is that there were some contrasting results between BL 
and FK in terms of their performance when stimuli were presented in different 
modalities. BL was particularly poor with tactile input while FK was poorest with 
verbal stimuli and pictures. In FK’s case, it could be argued that his performance 
decreased when the perceptual input was impoverished (with pictures and words 
compared with objects). In BL’s case the tactile condition could be poor if she failed 
to explore the object correctly, again generating impoverished perceptual input. Both 
patients were encouraged to explore objects fully in the tactile condition, but it was 
difficult to ensure that this was done consistently across the patients. Irrespective of 
this, the similarity of the ‘use advantage’ across the patients, combined with their 
similar semantic impairments, points to the use of perceptual information directly for 
action. 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Real object use facilitates object recognition in 
semantic agnosia 
Abstract 
In the present chapter I show that, in patients with poor semantic representations, the 
naming of real objects can improve when naming takes place after patients have been 
asked to use the objects, compared with when they name the objects either from 
vision or from touch alone, or together. In addition, the patients were strongly affected 
by action when required to name objects that were used correctly or incorrectly by the 
examiner. The data suggest that actions can be cued directly from sensory-motor 
associations, and that patients can then name on the basis of the evoked action.  
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Agnosic patients show impaired object recognition that cannot be attributed to 
elementary sensory defects, mental deterioration, attentional disturbances, aphasia 
misnaming, or unfamiliarity with sensorially presented stimuli (Bauer, 1993). A 
variety of different forms of agnosia have been described, varying from patients with 
early disturbances in contrasting forms of early perceptual processing (e.g., Riddoch 
et al., 2008) through to patients with deficits in accessing semantic representations 
following access to stored perceptual representations of objects (Hillis & Caramazza, 
1995; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987; see Humphreys & Riddoch, 2006, for a review).    
The term ‘semantic agnosia’ proposed to describe patient who appear to have a central 
deficit in accessing semantic information. For example, the patients perform poorly 
on tasks requiring matching between objects based on their conceptual or associative 
relationships. In cases where semantic knowledge itself is disturbed this may present 
as a multimodal deficit, where matching is disrupted irrespective of the modality of 
the stimuli (Riddoch, Humphreys, Coltheart & Funnell, 1988). In some cases of 
patients with semantic agnosia it has been reported that the patients can make 
relatively preserved gestures to objects even when they fail to name them (Hillis & 
Caramazza, 1995; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987), and, when the naming impairment 
is most pronounced from vision, the pattern of better gesturing than naming has also 
been labeled as optic aphasia (Ferreira, Giusiano, Ceccaldi & Poncet, 1997; Freund, 
1889). However, more detailed testing of such patients has also indicated that 
modality-specific deficits link to poor access to precise semantic knowledge about 
objects, rather than reflecting a deficit in modality-specific naming (Hillis & 
Caramazza, 1995; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987). In such cases, the relatively 
preserved ability to gesture to objects appears to be based on patients using the 
perceptual properties of the stimuli to direct the gestures (see Yoon, Heinke & 
Humphreys, 2002, for a simulation of this result). 
 The likelihood that agnosic patients successes in object recognition can 
depend on how objects are presented. For example, patients are typically better at the 
visual identification of real objects than of photographic images or line drawings of 
the same stimuli (e.g., Farah, 1990), at least in part because the patients are able to use 
additional cues with real objects (e.g., motion parallax and binocular depth cues) to 
facilitate object encoding (see Chainay and Humphreys, 2001). There are also some 
studies with normal observers demonstrating that correctly coloured objects may be 
named faster than line drawing, at least when the colour is informative about the 
object and the object is drawn from a class with perceptually similar neighbours 
(Price and Humphreys, 1989; Tanaka and Pressnell, 1999). However, colour seems 
unlikely to be contributory factor for patients who, along with being agnosic, are also 
achromatopsic (Riddoch and Humphreys, 1987; Chainay and Humphreys, 2001). 
There are also some suggestions that patients may use the visual properties of 
objects to directly access information about object use (see above), and they may infer 
the object’s identity from its function. For example, Sirigu et al. (1991) reported that 
their agnosic patient often named objects by describing how the object might be used 
and then identifying it from the functional properties being described. Wolk, Coslett 
and Glosser (2005) similarly reported a patient who was better able to identify objects 
that were rated as having strong ‘manipulative’ associations compared with objects 
that were rated as being low in manipulability. They suggest that the activation of 
manipulative associations can help patients retrieve information about object 
identities. Riddoch and Humphreys (1987) further documented a patient, JB, who was 
often able to gesture to visual presented objects despite having impaired access to 
semantic knowledge about the stimuli when formally tested. In many cases, JB then 
named the object from the gesture he produced. To account for their results, Riddoch 
and Humphreys proposed that visually presented objects could activate associated 
action-related knowledge independently of any access to associative semantic 
knowledge, with identification being mediated by action-related knowledge even 
when semantic access was impaired (see also Pülvermuller, 1999, for a similar 
proposal). This proposal, for an action-based mode of object identification operating 
in parallel with semantic-based naming has been simulated by Yoon et al. (2002) in 
their convergent route model of object naming and action retrieval. In this model 
gestures can be activated by associations between the perceptual properties of objects 
and action representations (e.g., the perceptual properties of a cup being associated 
with a drinking action) and this can operate independently of the activation of action 
representations from conceptual/semantic knowledge. If a patient generates an action 
through this ‘direct’ route between vision and action, then this may provide a new 
form of motion-based input into the perceptual recognition system, leading to better 
object recognition than that provided by the static image of the object. Ferreira et al. 
(1997) also showed that their patient was better able to name objects that were used in 
pantomime actions by the experimenter, which would fit with the idea of object 
gestures providing a distinct form of input into the recognition system (see Rothi, 
Ochipa & Heilman, 1997, for an explicit account). 
 In prior studies the ability to name through gesturing to objects has been 
reported in patients with a modality-specific deficit in naming and recognition 
(Ferreira et al., 1997; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987). In the present study I report data 
on whether patients with an apparent central semantic impairment can also show 
evidence of naming objects through action, compared with, when they just view or 
touch the same objects or to when they both view and touch the objects. We examined 
two patients with impaired semantic knowledge when tested across different 
modalities. Two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1 I assessed the ability 
of the patients to name objects after they were asked to use the stimuli compared to 
conditions in which the patients saw but could not touch the objects (vision only), 
held but could not see the objects (touch only) or both held and touched the objects 
but did not use them (combined vision + touch). Is there any advantage for naming 
objects after using them compared with when the tasks stress naming only, and can 
this emerge even if the patients are impaired at access semantic knowledge about the 
objects? Note that this could come about if, under conditions where action was 
stressed, the patients were able to use direct information from touch and vision to 
activate an action, and then named the objects via the actions. In Experiment 2 I 
evaluated the relations between object use and naming further. In this case, the 
examiner used the object with either the correct action (as in Ferreira et al., 1997) or 
with an incorrect action (e.g., using a toothbrush as a hairbrush) and had patients 
name the objects. Were the patients affected by the incorrect actions even when they 
were irrelevant to the naming task? Yoon and Humphreys (2005) reported that the 
times taken by normal participants to name objects were affected by the gestures 
being made with them, even when the gestures were irrelevant. Would the same 
emerge here on naming accuracy? To foreshadow the results, we show that, despite 
the patients having a semantic impairment in object recognition, their ability to name 
objects improved when they were asked to use the stimuli. Given the semantic 
impairment apparent in the patients, this ability to use the objects, and then name 
from the action, suggests that the actions were generated non-semantically. In 
addition, the patients were strongly affected by how the experimenter used the objects 
and misnamed objects in terms of the inappropriate action. We discuss the 
implications for understanding action retrieval and object naming. 
 
5.2 Experiment 1: Naming from use, vision, and touch 
5.2.1 Method 
Case reports 
 There were two participants, FK and BL.  See the case report in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
Design and Procedure 
 We assessed FK and BL’s ability to name objects under a variety of conditions in two 
sessions per condition which were conducted with at least one-week-gap between 
them: 
1. the objects were presented one at a time to each patient who was asked to 
show how the object was used and then to name it; 
2. the patients viewed each object from a distance of about 50 cm without 
touching it and were asked to name it; 
3. the patients were asked to pick up and feel each object without using it while 
they were blindfolded; then they had to name it; 
4. the patients were asked to both look and touch each object without using it and 
then to name it. 
There were 47 objects presented one at a time in each session of each 
condition, and conditions repeated twice in separate sessions (see Appendix C for list 
of objects). The order of the conditions (each conditions and its repeat) was 
randomized for each patient.  
As well as the conditions testing object naming, we examined the patients’ 
perceptual processing of the same objects from vision and their access to semantic 
knowledge about the objects from vision and from the object names (there is an 
overlap between the procedure and data of this experiment and the experiments 
reported in Chapter 4). Perceptual processing was tested by presenting each object for 
30s, then covering it and showing it in a new orientation alongside another similar 
object. The orientation shift was at least 90 degrees. The task was to point to which of 
the two re-presented objects was the same as the one just seen (visual matching across 
viewpoint).  
Semantic access was assessed by presenting each patient with triplets of 
objects (or object names, presented auditorally): one was a target object from the 
naming task (hammer), one was strongly associated to the target (nail) and the other 
(the distractor) was from the same general semantic category as the target but was not 
strongly associated to it (saw) (see Appendix C). The patient was asked to decide 
which two stimuli were used together or were related to one another. For the naming, 
perceptual matching and semantic matching tasks, control performance (2 participants 
(M/42 and F/78), 1 age-matched to each patient) was at ceiling and they did not 
produce any errors in the different conditions).  
 
5.2.2 Results 
Object naming 
The naming data were analysed using a Log Linear analysis with the factors being 
Patient, Condition, Test (first vs. second session) and Accuracy (number correct, 
number wrong)3
 A similar comparison was conducted between the naming from use (i) and 
naming from touch (iii) conditions. Here the final model again gave reliable 
interactions between Patient and Accuracy (χ2 (1)=43.11, p<0.001) and between 
Condition and Accuracy (χ2 (1) =9.27, p<0.01) (χ2 (10)=4.25, p=0.936 for the best 
fitting model). FK again named more objects than BL and naming overall was better 
in the object use condition (i) than when the objects were felt (condition iii). The 
advantage for the object use condition held across patients and test sessions. 
. A first comparison between the conditions of naming from object 
use (condition i) and naming from vision (condition ii) revealed a final model in 
which there were reliable interactions between Patient and Accuracy (χ2 (1) = 25.13, 
p<0.001) and also between Condition and Accuracy (χ2 (1) = 6.81, p<0.01) (χ2 
(10)=0.746, p=1.0 for the best fitting model). FK named more objects than BL, giving 
rise to the Patient x Accuracy interaction, but, across both patients and both test 
sessions for each condition, naming in the object use condition (i) was better than in 
the vision only condition (ii) (generating the Condition x Accuracy interaction) (see 
Table 10). 
 For the comparison between object use (i) and combined vision and touch (iv), 
the final model generated reliable interactions between Patient and Accuracy (χ2 (1) = 
41.97, p<0.001) and between Condition and Accuracy (χ2 (1) =8.72, p<0.01)(χ2 
(10)=4.73, p=0.909 for the final model). FK was more accurate overall than BL, and 
performance was better in the object use (i) condition than the combined vision and 
touch condition (iv). The improvement for the object use condition over the combined 
condition held across patients and test sessions.  
                                                 
3  By including Accuracy as a factor in this Log linear analysis, we test whether the relative 
number of correct to incorrect responses changed across the different conditions. This would be 
revealed by an interaction between the factor of Accuracy and the conditions of interest. 
The conditions of naming from vision only (ii), touch only (iii) and combined 
touch and vision (iv) were examined in a Log Linear analysis with the factors being 
Patient, Condition (vision only, touch only, vision + touch), Time (sessions 1 and 2) 
and Accuracy. The final model (χ2 (16) =5.87, p=0.989) revealed only an interaction 
between Patient and Accuracy (χ2 (1) = 64.39, p<0.001). FK named objects more 
accurately than BL but there were no differences across the conditions or test 
sessions. 
 Across all the presentation conditions the patients tended to make errors by 
either (i) failing to respond (60% of errors), (ii) making a semantic error (ladle  
soup; 20% of errors), (iii) describing a part of the object (scissors  a blade), and (iv) 
perseverations. There were no occasions on which the patients produced a verb name 
(e.g., brushing) when trying to name an object (e.g., hairbrush).  
 
Consistency of naming 
We analysed the consistency of the patients’ performance across the repeated trials of 
the Object use (i), Visual (ii), Tactile (iii) and Combined (Vision + Touch) conditions 
(iv) (see Appendix E for the mean scores of first and second trials) by comparing the 
differences in the number of occasions when both items were named accurately, one 
item was named accurately, or neither item was named accurately, relative to the 
probabilities of these responses if there was chance consistency (probability of correct 
or error on test 1 x probability on test 2 x number of trials). FK generated a level of 
consistency above chance, in all conditions: Object use (χ2 (3) = 13.47, p <0.01), 
Visual naming (χ2 (3) = 12.51, p<0.01), Tactile naming (χ2 (3) = 11.25, p = .01) and 
Combined (Vision + Touch; χ2 (3)=11.25, p=0.01). In contrast, BL did not show any 
consistency above chance (Object use, χ2 (3) = 2.39, p = .496; Visual naming, χ2 (3) = 
1.95, p = .583; Tactile naming, χ2 (3) = 3.45, p = .06; Combined (Vision + Touch), χ2 
(3)=3.45, p=0.327). 
 
Object use 
We assessed the number of correct action responses made by the patients. FK made 
68/94 (72%) correct actions while BL made 52/94 (55%) correct actions. (See 
Chapter 4 for more information). For FK the trend for more correct actions than 
correct name responses (when names were given immediately following each action) 
was not reliable (χ 2(1) = 2.0, p>0.05; McNemar test of change). BL, however, made 
significantly more correct gestures than correct name responses (χ2 (1) = 23.06, 
p<0.05; McNemar test of change).  
 
Consistency of naming and action 
The consistency between the action and immediate naming responses of the patients 
was also examined, comparing the observed number of trials where both the action 
and the name were correct, both incorrect, or one correct and the other incorrect, 
against the numbers expected by chance given the probability of a correct or error 
response being made for the action or naming task. Both FK and BL showed greater 
consistency between correct action use and naming than would be expected by chance 
(χ2 (3)= 19.54, p<0.001, for FK; χ2 (1) =8.07, p<0.045, for BL). FL had responded 
either both correctly or both incorrectly with the action and name on 81% (76/94) of 
the trials; BL had both correct or both incorrect on 64% (60/94) of the trials.  
 
 
Table 10: Frequency of correct scores in the patients compared to the controls 
  FK BL 
Object Naming   
Object use 50/94*** 24/94*** 
Visual 35/94*** 16/94*** 
Tactile 40/94*** 8/94*** 
Visual and Tactile 40/94*** 9/94*** 
   
Perceptual matching 19/22 20/22 
   
Semantic matching   
Name 12/25*** 10/25*** 
Object 13/25*** 11/25*** 
The Chi square tests are for the comparison between patient and control subjects 
*p<.05, **p<.001, ***p<.0001  
 
 
Perceptual matching 
The comparison between the patients’ performance and that of controls failed to show 
any reliable differences (FK, χ2 (1) = 3.22, p = .073; BL, χ2 (1) = 2.09, p = .148).     
Semantic matching 
Name presentation: When we presented the name of objects to be matched, FK made 
a correct match on 48% of the trials, while BL only matched objects correctly on 40% 
of the trials. Both patients performed significantly poorer than controls (FK, χ2 (1) = 
17.5, p< .001; BL, χ2 (1) = 21.4, p< .001), and neither was above chance. 
Object presentation: When required to carry out semantic matching with 
objects, FK scored 52% correct and BL in 44% correct. Again both patients generated 
considerably more errors than controls (FK, χ2 (1) = 15.7, p < .0001; BL, χ2 (1) = 
19.4, p < .0001) (see Table 10), and neither was above chance. 
 
5.2.3 Discussion 
Both FK and BL showed clear evidence of impaired semantic knowledge about 
objects, both when their performance on standardized tests was assessed (Table 10) 
and when their semantic matching performance was evaluated with the objects used 
in the naming tasks here (Table 10). This deficit was present both when stimuli were 
visually presented and when they were auditorally presented. In contrast, their 
perceptual matching of objects was relatively good. Based on the consistency of his 
performance it can be argued that FK has impaired semantic knowledge about objects 
(see also Humphreys & Forde, 2005, for additional evidence), in contrast BL was 
quite inconsistent on which items she named correctly across different test occasions 
– a pattern that suggests that there is impaired semantic access (cf. Warrington & 
Shallice, 1970). In previous cases where patients have been reported as having a 
multi-modal deficit that is inconsistent across items over time (as with BL here) it has 
been suggested that the brain lesion leads to central semantic representations entering 
a refractory state after initially being activated (perhaps due to loss of re-current 
excitatory links within the semantic system; Forde & Humphreys, 1995, 1997). 
Irrespective of this, both patients were better able to name objects that they were 
allowed to use relative to when the patients merely looked at or felt the objects 
(naming in the vision (ii) and touch only (iii) conditions) and relative to when the 
patients were able both to see and touch (but not move) the objects (iv). To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first formal report that patients with selectively impaired 
access to semantic knowledge show facilitated naming after they have been asked to 
use an object themselves, relative to the other naming conditions examined here. As 
noted in the Introduction, Ferreira et al. (1997) reported data from one patient who 
was better at naming an action pantomimed by the experimenter than at naming static 
objects, though the patient’s naming through his own actions was not examined. This 
patient was also better at retrieving verbs associated with objects than the names of 
the objects themselves, a pattern of performance observed too by Yoon, Humphreys 
and Riddoch (2005). Interestingly, the patient described by Yoon et al. (2005) was 
impaired at retrieving the associated verb when stimuli were presented verbally. Yoon 
et al. (2005) accounted for this result in terms of the convergent route model of action 
retrieval and naming. They proposed that the patient had a semantic deficit which 
disrupted verb retrieval when he was presented with object names, but, when objects 
were presented visually verbs could be retrieved non-semantically through the visual 
activation of action knowledge. The same account (based on direct access to action 
knowledge from vision) can be put forward to explain the superior naming of verbs 
when Ferreira et al.’s patient was presented with objects. 
 In addition to being better at naming objects after being required to use them, 
both patients also showed item-specific consistency in using and then naming objects. 
This result is most striking with patient BL, who failed to demonstrate item-specific 
consistency for any tests of naming across two occasions. The consistency generated 
from using and then naming the object is consistent with name retrieval being affected 
by the activation of action-based knowledge.  
The novel result here is that the patients’ ability to use the objects and to name 
the objects after use was coincident with them having a multi-modal semantic deficit. 
How then can this ‘object use’ effect come about? One possibility is that the 
perceptual input is in some way ‘richer’ in the use condition compared with the other 
conditions here. For instance, one referee suggested that, in the object use condition, 
information was available through modalities – from vision, touch and from seeing 
the object being used.  However, this proposal takes no account of how the objects 
came to be used correctly rather than incorrectly in the first place, from input then 
coming from two modalities – vision and touch. The ‘third’ modality (seeing the 
object being used) would only present appropriate information when the action was 
generated correctly. Neither of the patients made arbitrary/toying gestures to the 
objects and then guessed from these what the object might be, but rather they used the 
objects from the start after being asked to use them. Hence we must ask how the 
actions came to be generated correctly in the first place. The benefit seems to be 
unlikely to be due to the quality of the information coming from each of the critical 
input modalities in this ‘joint’ modality condition, compared to when only one 
modality was used.  Note that the patients could freely look at the objects from 
different angles in the vision only condition, and note also that the patients were able 
to match objects across different viewpoints. This argues against the recognition 
deficit, which generalized across modalities, reflecting a failure to derive sufficient 
visual information in the vision only case. Note also that, in the touch only condition 
(iii), the patients could pick up and feel the object, and so had available to them the 
same tactile information as they had in the object use condition. Another possibility is 
that the combination of vision and tactile information (in the object use condition (i)) 
may help the patients to access semantic information easier. This possibility was 
tested in visual and tactile condition (iv), when the perceptual input allowed 
information to be combined across the modalities the patients still performed poorly, 
however. As a final test of the idea that the patients benefitted from the presence of 
multi-modal associations that the objects may have, I examined whether the patients 
were better able to identify items that had object-specific associations with visual, 
touch and also sound (e.g., hammer, whistle, telephone) compared to objects that did 
not (e.g., salt-shaker, paintbrush). There was no evidence for objects with more cross-
modal associations being named more accurately than objects without these 
associations (summing across the visual and tactile presentation conditions, 8/14 for 
the multi-modal objects vs. 31/80 for testing at time 1 with FK; 4/14 vs. 10/80 for BL; 
χ2 (1) = 1.66 and 2.43 respectively, both p>0.05). 
The above data indicate that, unless the patients were cued to directly act with 
the object, they were unable to use perceptual input to access names through semantic 
knowledge, even when the input was derived across input coming simultaneously 
from vision and touch, and even when objects had multi-modal associations. We 
suggest that, when cued to respond using action, the combined sensory information 
was able to ‘drive’ the correct action in a direct, non-semantic manner, which then 
helped the patients to name the objects. One final point to note is that neither of the 
present patients made errors by naming the verb associated with the objects (e.g., 
scissors  cutting). In at least one prior report it has been noted that there was 
relatively good naming of verbs associated with visually presented objects even when 
object names were poorly produced (Yoon et al., 2005). I saw no evidence for this. 
Indeed, I also assessed whether there was better naming of objects whose names were 
at least partially related to a verb associated with object use (e.g., hammer) compared 
to object without associations to a verb name (e.g., ashtray). For BL there was no 
difference between these two classes of object (4/40 for objects whose named were 
partially associated with verbs; 10/54 for objects whose names had no such 
associations; χ2 (1) = 1.32, p>0.05, summing across visual and tactile modalities at 
test time 1). FK actually named more objects whose names were unassociated with 
verbs than objects whose names were associated with verbs (9/40 vs. 30/54, χ2 (1) = 
10.43, p<0.001). It should be noted that these comparisons are post-hoc and the 
objects entered into them were not matched in any way. Hence we should not make 
strong conclusions from the data. The point to note is that there was no evidence for 
naming mediated by retrieval of verb names, as opposed to the action itself being 
evoked by the objects.  
 
5.3 Experiment 2: Effects of correct and incorrect object use on 
naming 
I have used the results of Experiment 1 to suggest that the patients were influenced by 
a direct route to action from the visual properties of objects, when the task 
emphasized object use prior to naming. They may also have named the objects on 
occasions from the actions they produced. However, given the preponderance of 
failures to respond on naming trials, this last possibility was difficult to assess. 
Experiment 2 sought to provide a more direct test of the idea that there is naming 
from action by examining directly the effects of object use on the ability of the 
patients to name objects. 
FK and BL were presented with a sub-set of 20 of the objects from 
Experiment 1. These objects were then either used correctly or incorrectly the 
examiner and the patients were asked to name what the object was. In studies with 
normal participants Yoon and Humphreys (2005) have shown that object 
identification is slowed when objects are used incorrectly compared with when they 
are used correctly, suggesting that it is difficult to ignore information about object use 
even when it is irrelevant to the task. Here we test if the patients show an abnormal 
effect of action by making errors when the action information is incongruent with the 
object. 
5.3.1 Method 
The patients were presented with a sub-set of the objects used in Experiment 1. On 
each trial the patient sat opposite the examiner, who grasped a target object and either 
used it appropriately or inappropriately. Inappropriate actions took the form of an 
action appropriate for another object (using a toothbrush as a hairbrush). The objects 
and conditions were presented in a random order for each patient. The task was to 
name the object on each trial. 
 
5.3.2 Results 
FK named 14/20 of the objects correctly when they were used appropriately and 6/20 
when they were used inappropriately. BL scored 11/20 and 2/20 correct in the same 
conditions. In both cases object naming was strongly affected by object use 
(McNemar test of change, p=0.008 and 0.004 respectively). In the incorrect action 
condition FK misidentified 6 objects by naming them in terms of the object that 
would have matched the gesture (toothbrush used as hairbrush  comb); BL made 5 
equivalent errors in the incorrect use condition. 
 
 
5.3.3 Discussion 
The results show that both patients were affected by how the objects were used, and 
they were better at naming objects in the correct use condition than in the incorrect 
use condition. Also, on incorrect use trials they sometimes misnamed objects in terms 
of the action that was performed. The results are consistent with the proposal that the 
patients tended to name objects from action. Note however, that even when all the 
actions were correctly carried out, the patients were still far from perfect. This 
indicates that the patients had some problem in recognizing actions, which may reflect 
their central semantic impairment. This would limit object-naming performance, even 
if the ability to retrieve actions non-semantically from objects were perfect. 
 
5.4 General Discussion 
We have presented two experiments on two patients with a multi-modal semantic 
impairment. In Experiment 1 we found that the patients were better able to name 
objects after being requested to use them, compared with when the same objects were 
shown visually, through touch or through both vision and touch (without object use). 
The sensory input in this last condition matches that in the object use condition at 
least up to the enactment of the action. Thus the object use advantage cannot be 
attributed simply to more input being present – since the sensory input would need to 
access the information about object use before any enactment took place. It is difficult 
to see how this could operate semantically, given that both patients had a semantic 
impairment. Instead we suggest that the patients were able to use direct associations 
between the sensory input and actions, and these enabled the actions to be elicited 
when the ‘action route’ was emphasized by the task. Objects were then named through 
the action information that was retrieved. Consistent with this last proposal, we found 
that both patients showed greater item-specific consistency when using and then 
naming objects than expected by chance, even though one patient (BL) showed highly 
inconsistent performance in her naming of objects across different occasions. 
In Experiment 2 we provided further evidence for the patients naming through 
the direct activation of action knowledge. In this experiment we presented the patients 
with objects that were used either correctly or incorrectly. Object naming was better 
under conditions of correct action, and, when objects were used incorrectly the 
patients sometimes misnamed objects in terms of the actions. 
 It might be argued that the gains generated by naming objects through 
associated actions were relatively modest (e.g., in Experiment 1 FK showed a 16% 
gain in the object use condition compared with the vision-only condition, and BL 
showed only a 9% benefit). However, the patients both had impairments in identifying 
actions and were far from perfect even when shown objects that were being used 
correctly (Experiment 2). When action knowledge is retrieved, this information still 
needs to be used for naming, and this likely involves accessing conceptual knowledge 
to link an action to a name. Both patients had conceptual impairments, which would 
disrupt this process. However, despite this the gains that we did observe, which held 
across patients and test sessions, are consistent with extra information signalled by 
action, and with the action information being retrieved non-semantically, by direct 
visuo-motor association in Experiment 1.  In the present cases, naming from action 
appeared to overcome a residual deficit in accessing semantic information, enabling 
objects to be named more accurately. The same direct visuo-motor associations may 
also underlay the better gesturing than visual naming performance in patients classed 
as optic aphasic (see Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
 Rehabilitation of Apraxia 
 
Abstract 
Studies on the re-mediation of apraxia have focused on re-training gesture production. 
In this part of the study, I sought to see the influence of re-learning transitive and 
intransitive gestures in a case of both aphasia and apraxia (DS). The treatment 
consisted of presenting multiple cues to using a given tool. The results showed an 
improvement at making transitive gestures for the trained objects. There was no 
generalization of training in apraxia which fits with prior studies on rehabilitation of 
apraxia 
 
6.1 Introduction 
One of the cognitive impairments following stroke that can have a major impact on 
independence in activities of daily living is apraxia. Limb apraxia is generally 
understood as covering all those disorders of purposive movements resulting from 
neurological dysfunction which cannot be explained by intellectual deterioration, lack 
of cooperation, sensory disturbances, agnosia, disrupted body schema, visio-spatial 
disturbances or aphasia (Maher and Ochipa, 1997). The relative frequency of limb 
apraxia in patients with stroke is 51.3 % after left hemisphere lesions and 6.0 % after 
right hemisphere lesion (Zwinkles, Geusgens, Van de Sande, and Van Heugten (2004). 
One general distinction between patients with apraxia is based (essentially) on 
whether a patient cannot access information about what they are to do with an object 
(e.g., because the plan of action is disrupted) or whether the patient knows what to do 
but not how to do (De Renzi, 1989) – a distinction between so-called ideational and 
ideomotor forms of the disorder. The deficits can involve both single and series of 
movements and can be found (depending on the patient) in multiple modalities – in 
gesturing to verbal command, in gesturing to visual and/or tactile presentations of 
objects, or in imitating objects.  
Studies on the remediation of apraxia have focused on re-training gesture 
production (Maher, Rothi and Greenwald, 1991; Pilgrim and Humphreys, 1994) (see 
Chapter 1 for more information about previous studies in rehabilitation of ADL 
disorder). This ability to re-learn gesture production may be particularly important for 
patients dependent on gesture as a primary method for communication, as is the case 
for individuals with both aphasia and apraxia (such as patient DS, who was studied 
here). 
There are some studies on training of communicative gestures, as well. Code and 
Gaunti (1986) studied a case of limb apraxia with sever Broca’s aphasia and disrupted 
communicative hand signs following CVA. Code and Gaunti formed a six-stage 
hierarchical program involving imitation, fading and reinforcement focused on 
pairing the word and sign in response to various commands for 1 session in a week in 
8 months. The results showed improvement in production of gestures to word and 
word to gesture on post-test. Moreover, in 1991, Cubelli, Trentini, and Montagna 
trained a woman with global aphasia and limb apraxia to pantomime to visually 
presented objects and actions by drawing attention to distinctive features of objects 
and perceptual characteristics and presenting possible pantomime for each picture to 
be imitated. Cubelli et al. saw improvement in performing pantomime after 2 months 
training (2 sessions in a week), and interestingly they found generalization to 
untrained gestures without improvement in apraxia post assessment. Hence, Cubelli et 
al.  concluded that limb apraxia does not affect acquisition of communicative signs 
and gestures. 
 The data on rehabilitation suggest that patients are able to re-acquire gestures 
and to re-learn how to perform functional tasks, though the factors underlying any 
improvements (and whether improvements generalise across items) are not well 
understood (see Table 10). Some prior results have shown poor generalisation of 
gesture training in apraxia (e.g., Ochipa et al., 1991; Pilgrim & Humphreys, 1994), 
but other reports have noted some generalisation (Maher et al., 1991; Smania et al., 
2000). The question here is whether this because there is generalization when an 
ideational/comprehension problem is involved whereas purely ideomotor patients 
only improve with trained items. Could this be separated here by testing effects of 
training on a patient who shows good comprehension for some types of gestures (e.g. 
transitive, object gestures) but not others (intransitive, symbolic gestures)? Answering 
this question formed the motivation for this study. 
Table 11: Summary of studies on the rehabilitation of non-communicative 
gestures in apraxia 
Study & Design   Subjects  Training Used  Results 
Maher, Rothi and 55-year-old man with a 22 m.  Goal: Successful gesture to visual  
Immediately post-treatment: improved 
verbal pantomime 
Greenwald (1991) history of IMA with presented  presentation of tool error performance on both trained and 
 gesture recognition Intervention: Multiple cue provision untrained gestures but no improvement on 
  (tool, object, visual model, feedback) A probe measure of 10 meaningless 
  with gradual fading gesture sequences. 
  Feedback: Knowledge of results and  Two weeks post-treatment: both treated and 
  error correction through modeling untreated gestures performance diminished   
  and physical limb manipulation with the former having some retained gains. 
  Frequency: 1hr/day for 2wks  
    
Ochipa, Maher Two participants with 3 and 4yr. Goal: Decrease errors in movement Errors did not decrease until targeted in  
and Rothi (1995) 
history of ideomotor apraxia 
(IMA) with presented  Intervention: Treatment geared treatment. At post-treatment and two-week  
  gesture recognition and toward their specific IMA error follow-up both subjects demonstrated  
  Aphasia 
Profile (need another sentence to 
describe treatment) treatment gains on treated but not untreated  
      gestures, as measured by verbal pantomime 
      error scoring and Florida Apraxia Screening  
      Test(FAST). 
        
Pilgrim and Head injured participant Goal: Appropriate gestures during  Differences between pre-  and post-tests 
Humphreys (1994) with left-sided IMA 23 m. object use measuring ability to gesture to verbal, visual, 
 post-injury Intervention: Modified conductive and visual and tactile command  
  education coupled with diminishing demonstrated changes in trained but not  
  amounts of physical assistance 
untrained gestures. The conductive education 
strategy was not carried  
  Frequency: 1/day for 3 wks+ out spontaneously post-treatment 
  15 min/day practice with spouse  
    
Smania, Girardi, 13 left CVA participants Goal: Improve gesture production on 
The treated group of participants showed 
significant improvement 
Domenicali, Lara with apraxia lasting greater  wide range of test 
in post-tests of IMA and ideational apraxia 
(IA), along with a 
and Aglioti (2000) than 2m. Random assignment  Intervention: Training occurred in 3 significant error reduction in IMA and IA  
  to apraxia treatment or parts for transitive, intransitive- 
Tests. There was also a trend toward 
improved gesture 
  conventional treatment group symbolic and intransitive non- comprehension following treatment 
    symbolic gestures. Training in each    
    segment graded from multiple to   
    minimal contextual cueing conditions   
    and assistance was provided   
    verbally, visually or manually.   
    Frequency: 35 session maximum   
    (50min, 3/wk).   
        
Source: adapted from Hebert and Roy 2002. 
6.2 Case report 
DS was 74 year old when tested. He suffered a stroke in 1995 and he used to be a 
train inspector pre-morbidly. DS lives at home with his wife but functioned in a 
relatively self-sufficient manner. His MRI report revealed a large lesion to the left 
inferior; middle and superior frontal gyrus, left pre-central gyrus, and left post-central 
gyrus (see Figure 9). He presented with hemiplegia and aphasia. There was poor 
function of his right hand and DS made all responses in our study using his left hand, 
which had good motor function. His full IQ score on WAIS was 72. His Wechsler 
memory score was 56 verbal and 79 visual, with the verbal score perhaps being 
depressed to some degree by his language impairment. Digit span was 4 forward and 
2 backwards. Visual and tactile perceptions were intact. He scored 0 on the clinical 
version of the Stroop test and also failed to progress beyond the first colour category 
on the Wisconsin Card task. He did not show major symptoms of everyday action 
dysfunction on tests of ADL (data reported in Forde & Humphreys, 1998). However 
earlier work had pointed to DS being particularly poor at forming the appropriate grip 
when ask to gesture how to use objects (Chainay & Humphreys, 2002). He made just 
a few conceptual errors (e.g., making a gesture to an item related but not identical to 
the stimulus he was cued to). He was also better at showing how to use an object 
when he was holding it than he was at gesturing to verbal command or following 
visual presentation of the object. These prior results suggest a form of ideomotor 
apraxia reflecting poor planning and execution of actions, along with relatively spared 
recognition of actions (see Chapter 4 for similar results in other patients). 
 
 
Figure 9: DS' MRI Scan 
6.3 Method 
The data in the present study were collected across three different assessment 
sessions:  
 Baseline section including two sessions with one week gap between;  
 Immediate post treatment sections, started two weeks after baseline;  and 
 Follow up section (eight weeks after baseline) 
Limb praxic function was evaluated by requiring DS to perform transitive and 
intransitive symbolic gestures. The test is based on the work of De Renzi (1989) and 
consists of 40 transitive items (e.g. hammer, toothbrush) and 14 symbolic-intransitive 
gestures (e.g. Salute like a soldier). All items were randomly classified to a study or 
control group.  
   Before and after the treatment (immediate post-treatment and follow-up) DS 
underwent a series of standardized neuropsychological tests to provide independent 
assessments of performance in a multiple-baseline design. These standardised tests 
included: 
 Object naming from BORB (Riddoch and Humphreys, 1993) 
 Object recognition by action (Naming objects based on their action) 
 Rule shift card from Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome 
(BADS) (Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie, and Evans, 1996)  
 Brixton Test (rule attainment and rule detection task) 
6.3.1 Intervention 
The intervention consisted of presenting DS with multiple cues to using a given tool 
(a picture, a real object, a visual model, copying and feedback) and asking him to 
demonstrate the use of the target. The length of training depended on the number of 
contextual cues used in different sections and it was performed in weekly sessions in 
the University (where he given feedback to indicate the correct actions) and daily 
homework gesture-production exercises. For both training in the University and at 
home, DS received both transitive and intransitive-symbolic gesture training. 
  
6.3.2 Transitive gesture training 
First DS was given the name of a common tool and he was required to show the 
experimenter how to use that object (gesture to verbal command). If there were errors 
then a picture of the target object was shown and DS was required to produce the 
corresponding gestural pantomime (gesture to picture). If an error was still made, DS 
was presented with the real tool and asked to pantomime the use of that object. 
Finally, DS was asked to copy the examiner’s action (articulated step by step) and, 
subsequently, to reproduce the gesture. Any errors in all sections were corrected and 
DS was given verbal feedback of his performance. Once DS was able to correctly 
perform the correct relevant gesture, another object was presented. This type of 
training program was given weekly within the University. At home DS undertook 
daily exercises to real objects and their pictures and names. In this case he was asked 
to try to make a gesture first to word and then to picture and then, finally, he was 
requested to try and show how the objects was used when he held it in his hand. 
These tasks were performed without feedback. Note that previous work shows that 
apraxic patients are typically better at gesturing when asked to use the actual objects 
relative to when they gesture to pictures or to verbal command without holding the 
objects (e.g. Grailet, Seron, Bruyer, Coyette, and Frederix, 1990) (see also Chapter 4). 
6.3.3 Intransitive-symbolic gesture training 
DS was asked to produce a correct, symbolic gesture to a verbal command (e.g. salute 
like a soldier). If there was any type of error DS was given feedback and he was asked 
to copy the examiner’s actions, step by step. The criterion for passing from one task to 
another was the same as for the transitive gestures. 
For both types of gesture DS was credited 1 point if he performed flawlessly 
on his first attempt; if his performance was unsatisfactory (e.g., due to making the 
wrong conceptual gesture or a gesture inaccurate in execution), he was credited 0 
points. The transitive test included 20 experimental items (score 0 – 20) and the 
symbolic intransitive test 7 trials (score 0 – 7) (the other items were ‘controls’, and 
did not appear during the training sessions). All DS’s responses were video-recorded 
and scored by two raters – one experiment (KM) and one independent judge. There 
was good agreement between the judges (90%+ concurrence rate); only the scores of 
KM are analysed below. 
 
5.4 Results 
DS’s performance was compared between the initial baseline sessions and the last 
training session (week 7) and the follow-up session (week 9), using sign tests for both 
the experimental and control stimuli. The scores for the experimental and control 
items are presented in Figure 10 Transitive gestures to experimental objects improved 
reliably from pre- to last post training section shows significant improvement in his 
performance; p < .0001. In addition he performed well on follow-up testing; for the 
comparison with the original baseline, Exact sign (2-tailed) = .004. In contrast to this 
DS’s performance in gesturing to control objects did not differ between pre- and post-
training; p = .727, or between pre-training and follow-up; p = 1.  
With symbolic gestures DS’s performance showed no significant 
improvement, either for the experimental items (p = .125 for pre- vs. post-training) or 
control stimuli (p= .577 for pre- vs. post-tests).   
 
 
 
Figure 10: Comparing all tasks across different sections 
6.4.2 Neuropsychological tests 
The results of other cognitive tests are presented in Table 12.  
Table 12: Scores for control cognitive tests 
Control Cognitive Tests             Pre Post Follow-up 
Object naming 66/91 75/91 71/91 
Object recognition 13/23 15/23 16/23 
Rule Shift Cards 9/20 11/20 11/20 
BRIXTON 38/55 39/55 32/55 
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Comparing pre and post data of control cognitive tests indicate that there is no 
improvement over time in the neuropsychological tests. A McNemar test was used to 
compare the difference between  pre and post in object naming task and the difference 
was considered to be not quite statistically significant (two-tailed P value = 0.073). In 
addition, comparing the data in the Chi square tests showed that there were no 
improvement in object recognition (χ2 (1) = 1.84, p = .174), rule shift cards (χ2 (1) = 
0.808, p = .368), and BRIXTON test (χ2 (1) = 2.68, p = 0.1). 
 
6.5 Discussion 
The results showed that DS improved at making transitive gestures for the objects he 
was trained on, but there was no improvement at making transitive gestures in general 
(e.g., for control stimuli) and no improvement at making intransitive, symbolic 
gestures. There was also no indication of any generalised improvement over time, in 
other neuropsychological tests unrelated to the training. The data suggest that there is 
a specific training effect, which can be maintained over the longer-term, but which is 
specific to the items trained. 
 These data match some prior results, which have again shown poor 
generalisation of gesture training in apraxia (e.g., Ochipa et al., 1991; Pilgrim & 
Humphreys, 1994), but they differ from other reports that some generalisation has 
been noted (Maher et al., 1991; Smania et al., 2000). What are the critical factors that 
may predict whether generalisation across items does and does not take place? In 
studies where there is a lack of generalisation, treatment has been targeted at patients 
with ideomotor apraxia (e.g., Ochipa et al., 1991; Pilgrim & Humphreys, 1994). This 
is less clearly the case in papers where generalisation has been shown (Maher et al., 
1991; Smania et al., 2000), where patients have shown evidence of ideational as well 
as ideomotor deficits (Smania et al., 2000). In the present study DS showed better 
comprehension of transitive gestures to objects than intransitive, symbolic gestures; 
there was learning only of transitive gestures but this did not generalise. These data 
suggest that DS’s learning here operated at a level of motor planning and/or 
articulation, and that, after training, he was better able to instantiate motor 
programmes for trained items. It appears that these motor programmes failed to 
generalise, however. This fits with the view that the programmes were represented not 
in terms of their specific component movements but rather in terms of an integrated 
movement pattern, which held for the treated items but then did not generalise. 
Recently, Graziano (2006) has presented evidence from single cell recordings for 
motor programmes based on whole movement patterns, while components 
movements making up the whole patterns were not represented independently. Our 
data are consistent with training helping to build-up specific, whole movement 
representations, but these then fail to generalise to new stimuli. It is possible that 
similar effects held for other training studies with patients with ideomotor deficits 
(Ochipa et al., 1991; Pilgrim & Humphreys, 1994).  
 Our training regime had little impact on stimuli for which DS had impaired 
comprehension (instransitive symbolic gestures, some transitive gestures). This might 
be because the training did not emphasise conceptual information about the stimuli 
and it did not distinguish between the trained stimuli and other, conceptually similar 
stimuli. We speculate that, in other cases where generalisation has been shown, then 
(i) training has targeted conceptual as well as motor programming operations, and (ii) 
the effect of this training is either to help distinguish the conceptual representation of 
one stimulus from that of another or to build up the concept of the motor action in a 
patient. If this conceptual representation is based on distributed coding, then it may 
support generalisation to other items (e.g., from one tool to another).  
 A final point to note is that the improved gesturing to stimuli was very 
unlikely to be due to generalised spontaneous recovery. For example, there was no 
improvement for intransitive, symbolic gestures, and in addition there was no 
evidence of spontaneous improvement in the other (non-action related) cognitive 
tests. This again points to there being a specific training effect, confined to the re-
learning of whole-movement representations of gestures to objects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 7 
Eye movements in action disorganisation syndrome: 
A single case analysis 
 
Abstract 
This study examines eye movements made by a patient with action disorganisation 
syndrome (ADS) as everyday tasks are performed. Relative to both normal 
participants and control patients, the ADS patient showed normal time-locking of 
attention to the subsequent use of objects. However, there were proportionately more 
unrelated fixations and more fixations concerned with locating objects than found in 
the control participants. In addition, eye movements away from objects being used 
were made earlier in the ADS patient, and toying errors were linked to multiple, brief 
fixations being made to the object involved. The data highlight that eye movement 
analyses can be used to study the deficits contributing to ADS, with in this case, the 
changes in eye movements being linked to impaired top-down guidance of task 
performance and to action being disconnected from error monitoring operations. 
7.1 Introduction 
There is a long history of attempts to use eye movements to infer cognitive processes 
(Hayhoe, 2004). The behaviour of the oculomotor system has been studied across a 
range of tasks including reading text (O’Regan 1990; Rayner 1995), music reading 
(Land and Furneaux 1997), and steering a car (Land and Lee 1994). In many cases the 
results indicate that the eyes sample regions of field that maximise the useful input for 
the task. Studies of eye movements performed while people undertake repetitive tasks 
(such as copying a block pattern; Ballard et al. 1992; Hayhoe et al. 1998) have further 
suggested that eye movements can be quite tightly coupled to the motor actions of the 
participant. Of particular relevance to the current study, Land et al. (1999) examined 
the patterns of fixation during the performance of a well-learned everyday task 
(making a cup of tea), classifying the eye movements taking place in relation to task 
performance. Land et al. found that objects were fixated because of their relevance to 
ongoing related acts (ORA; Land et al., 1999) or ‘A1 units of action’ (Schwartz et al., 
1991, 1995), not because the objects were big, bright, or distinctive in other ways. As 
a consequence they concluded that eye movements during familiar purposeful actions 
were driven by principally the memory or ‘script’ for the activity, not simply because 
of its ‘visual salience’. 
In order to accomplish many everyday tasks successfully we must recognize the 
objects involved, recall the component actions and their sequence, and, as the 
component actions are being carried out, we must maintain a record of our current 
position and not repeat steps already completed. One initial operation involves 
retrieving a stored memory for the tasks that details both the component behaviors 
and their sequence, described as ‘schema’ for particular tasks (Grafman, 1989). In 
addition, Land et al. (1999) suggested that even automated routine activities require a 
surprising level of continuous monitoring, revealed by fixations typically falling close 
to the objects being manipulated and very few fixations being irrelevant to the task. 
Land et al. conclude that, although the actions in a familiar task such as making tea 
are ‘automated’ (Norman and Shallice, 1986), and may proceed with little conscious 
involvement the eyes closely monitor each step in the process. 
Land and Hayhoe (2001) examined the relations between eye and hand 
movements in extended food preparation tasks, tea-making and making peanut butter 
and jelly sandwiches. They found that participants typically gazed at the next object in 
the sequence before any sign of manipulative action, indicating that eye movements 
play a part in the planning of actions to objects. Land and Hayhoe also reported that 
the eyes usually fixated the same object throughout the action that was performed 
upon it, although saccades could be made to the next object in the sequence before 
completion of the preceding action. Thus there may be a process in which a fixation 
on an object is made to provide high resolution information to guide a hand action, 
and this remains as the hand action is programmed, but after this, the eyes may move 
on to the next most relevant object for the task. Eye movements are thus in the 
vanguard of each action plan, and are not simply responses to environmental 
circumstances (see also Land, Mennie and Rusted 1999; Land, Furneaux and Gilchrist 
2002). In addition to this, regressive eye movements can occur, suggesting a re-
checking process taking place on some occasions. 
The role that eye movements may play in the behaviour of patients with 
acquired problems in everyday action has been relatively little studied. Forde et al. 
(sub.) examined eye movements in a patient with the neuropsychological syndrome of 
‘action disorganisation syndrome’ (ADS), whose ability to carry out everyday tasks 
was highly disturbed (patient FK). Prior evidence has suggested that FK has impaired 
stored knowledge about everyday tasks (Forde & Humphreys, 1998). Interestingly, 
many aspects of FK’s eye movements were relatively normal (e.g., the timing 
relations between his fixations on objects and his use of the objects), though some 
abnormalities were observed. For example, unlike normal participants, FK made no 
advance glances to objects that were about to be used, and he made increased 
numbers of fixations to irrelevant objects during the task. Both results are consistent 
with FK lacking stored knowledge about the tasks. There were also differences in the 
eye movements made when correct actions were performed and eye movements when 
perseverative actions occurred. During perseverations FK made proportionately fewer 
fixations to other objects in the environment and relatively more (but briefer) to the 
object being used (compared with when the action was correct). On these occasions 
FK seemed to be monitoring the action through the eye movement, but without 
linking any incoming information back to the goals of his behaviour (e.g., to detect 
the error). The data suggest that there may be relatively preserved ‘local coupling’ 
between eye movements and behaviour in a patient with apparent loss of the overall 
schema for the task, but that the patterns of eye movements can still be revealing of 
the underlying disturbance in such patients. 
  The present study extended previous work by examining the relations between 
eye movements and everyday action in another patient who presented with ADS – 
BL. As described below, BL made many of the errors characteristics of patients with 
ADS including omissions, sequence errors, and quality/spatial errors (see Schwarz, 
2006, for an overview of errors in ADS).  She was also particularly affected when 
distractor objects were present during task performance (even when the distractors 
were unrelated to the task), and semantic errors also emerged in this condition. 
Neuropsychological testing indicated that BL had a central disturbance in her 
semantic knowledge about objects, along with also impaired knowledge of the 
ordering of steps in everyday life tasks. Given this, it was of interest to assess whether 
her eye movements would provide evidence of increased distractibility, due to not 
having top-down knowledge to guide eye movements to objects linked to up-coming 
actions.  
 
7.2 Background data 
The clinical case. BL was 80 years old when she was tested. She was formerly a 
General Practitioner who suffered a stroke in 1998, affecting her left occipito-
temporal cortex. Subsequent to this she presented with a number of 
neuropsychological deficits including alexia (18/26 on identifying single letters; 0 
reading of 20 HF concrete, short words), and object recognition. Her scores on 
standardized tests of object recognition are shown in Table 6. There was evidence of 
relatively preserved perceptual processing from both vision and touch, along with 
impaired access to semantic knowledge. On other neuropsychological tests BL had 
some problems with executive function tasks, having an error score of 21 on the 
Brixton test of non-verbal executive function (finding a rule and rule shifting; a score 
of 26 indicates a clinical impairments; Burgess & Shallice, 1997). She had a Corsi 
block span of 3 and a digit span of 4 (forwards). 
 
 
7.4 Defining ADS 
BL’s performance on everyday life tasks was examined in 4 tasks requiring her to: (i) 
make a cup of tea with milk and sugar; (ii) make a cheese sandwich; (iii) wrap a gift, 
and (iv) write a birthday card and prepare it for the post. BL’s success on these tasks 
was compared with that of 4 brain-lesioned ‘control’ patients (two with unilateral 
frontal lesions (1 left, 1 right) and two with lesions of the temporo-parietal junction (1 
left, 1 right). BL performed the tasks twice, once when there were no distractors 
present in the task, and once with unrelated distractors present. The control patients 
only performed the tasks when unrelated distractors were present. Performance was 
videotaped for later analysis. The videos were transcribed to record every action made 
by each patient. The action coding system (ACS) developed by Schwartz et al. (1991) 
was used to provide quantitative and qualitative measures of each subject’s 
performance. Each patient’s errors were classified into a number of different 
categories including: 
 Omission:  When a patient omitted one of the steps to accomplish the task. 
 Semantic: When a semantically related object was used in place of the target 
object. 
 Sequence: When an action was performed in a wrong order (according to 
norms collected in previous studies for these tasks, (e.g. see Humphreys & 
Forde, 1998). 
 Addition: When the patient added an action that was outside the range of 
actions produced by normal group participants. 
 Quality/ Spatial: When the patient misjudged the appropriate amount of 
something or the spatial orientation of the objects. 
 Perseveration: When an action or action sequence was repeated after achieving 
its goal. 
 Toying/ Capture: Reaching towards or lifting an object without actually using 
that for any purpose.  
 BL made 14 errors when carrying out the basic versions of the tasks (no 
distractors) and 23 when unrelated distractors were present. For comparison, the ADS 
patient FK (Humphreys & Forde, 1998) made 15 and 21 errors under matching 
conditions. The 4 control patients made an average of 4.75 errors (SD 1.25). Thus the 
numbers of errors made by BL in the basic version of the tasks were 6 times greater 
than the standard deviation added to the mean of the control patients (in the distractor 
condition) and her performance when unrelated distractors were present was over 14 
times greater than the standard deviation added to the mean. BL was clearly worse 
than the control patients. She made a relatively large proportion of step omissions 
(33% of her errors) but in addition made quality/spatial errors (23 toying errors (14%) 
and added inappropriate actions such as writing address on the gift (12% of all her 
errors). 
 These results provide confirmation that BL presented with a pattern of ADS, 
which may be exacerbated by having a central semantic impairment for objects. (See 
chapter 1 for more definition of ADS). To assess BL’s knowledge of everyday tasks, 
she was given sequences of photographs indicating key steps in 4 tasks (tea, gift, 
sandwich, writing a letter) and asked to sort them into an appropriate order for the 
tasks. She failed to order the steps correctly for any task and made only 15 correct 
local orderings of consecutive steps out of the 27 correct steps possible. This suggests 
either that BL has fragmentary stored knowledge about the order of the steps in 
everyday tasks or she had difficulty sorting the actions due to her problems in object 
recognition. To try and circumvent the recognition problem, the action in each 
photograph was read out to BL and, having gone through twice each action within 
each task, she was asked to put them in the right order for the task. She was told to 
ask if she was unsure of what the action was. Even under this circumstance BL made 
only 17 correct local orderings. The control patients generated a mean correct 
ordering of 25/27 with a standard deviation of 1.63. BL’s score fell more than 3 
standard deviations below the mean of the controls. This last finding is consistent 
with BL having problems in reconstructing the correct order of the steps in everyday 
tasks, over and above any problem in visual recognition. 
 
7.5 The current study 
BL’s eye movements and hand actions were recorded when she carried out two 
familiar everyday life tasks: making a cup of tea (with milk and sugar) and making a 
cheese sandwich. Her performance was compared with that of two normal age-
matched control participants and with two control patients, DS and JF, both of whom 
were matched to BL in terms of general executive function (Brixton test scores of 20 
and 24, for patients DS and JF). DS was also used as a control patient in the analysis 
of everyday action reported by Humphreys and Forde (1998).  Eye movements were 
scored following the procedures used by Land et al. (1999). Land et al. classified 
patterns of fixation into four categories including: locating (looking at objects that 
would subsequently be used in the task in order to establish the location of objects, 
even though there is no associated motor activity at the time of the fixation); directing 
(fixation on the hand or object in the hand during moving to new location); guiding 
(fixation in approaching one object to another that two or more objects have to be 
guided relative to each other); and checking (looking at objects to check the 
appropriate state). Hayhoe (2000) found that the same analysis fitted equally well in 
making a peanut butter and jelly sandwich task.  
 7.6 Method 
One experimental patient, BL, two control patients (DS and JF), and two normal 
participants (Female, aged 65 and 52), were studied in two simple everyday tasks; 
making a cup of tea with milk and sugar and making a cheese sandwich and putting it 
in a sandwich bag. The two control patients were DS (Male, aged 73) and JF (Male, 
aged 68). DS had lesions of left inferior, middle and superior frontal gyrus and major 
clinical symptoms of right hemiplegia and aphasia.  JF presented with progressive 
aphasia and cortical atrophy primarily confined to posterior parietal cortex. None of 
control patients had a major disorder in actions of daily living. DS had a Corsi block 
span of 3 and a forwards digit span of 4 (matched to BL). JF had a Corsi block span 
of 4 and a forwards digit span of 4 too. 
The direction of fixation was recorded using a head-mounted video camera 
system (see also Forti et al. 2005). This is a non-intrusive device that allows normal 
head and body movement during tracking, and was used to monitor the eye movement 
of subjects. Eye movements were measured from the right eye using a SensoMotoric 
Instrument (GmbH) HED corneal reflection based eye tracker. This system consists of 
a head-mounted device with a scene camera that captures the participant’s field of 
view and an eye camera that records an image of the eye. After calibration the system 
produces a video image of the scene with a superimposed cursor that represents the 
position that the participant is fixating. Because the relationship between the scene 
camera and eye camera is fixated, the participant is free to move their head. The video 
output was digitized at 25 frames/s for subsequent offline frame-by-frame analysis 
using a software based DVD player. Gaze direction was determined to an accuracy of 
approximately 1°. The subjects were precisely calibrated at the beginning of each 
recording session by asking participant to fixate each of five markers placed on the 
table surface (at the centre and towards the four corners). Each subject wore the eye 
tracker and was placed individually in front of a table and asked to perform a 
particular task. All the objects for the task were located on the table (7 objects for the 
tea task; 5 objects for the sandwich task) BL was instructed to use all of the objects 
present before her action. Actions were monitored also from an external viewpoint for 
further analyses. 
 
7.7 Results 
7.7.1 Execution of the task 
Based on the action coding system (ACS) (see Schwartz et al. 1991 for more 
information), BL made 3 errors when making a cup of tea: one Omission error (she 
did not boil the water), one Sequence error (she failed to put the teabag in the teapot 
but put it in cup), and one Spatial error (pouring sugar outside instead of inside the 
cup). BL performed the sandwich task with 2 errors: one Toying error (took the 
sandwich bag and put it back without using) and one Omission  (she made the 
sandwich with one slice of bread instead of two). The control patients and normal 
participants completed the task without error. 
7.7.2 Number of fixation and relatedness 
Despite the fact that BL omitted the longest sequence of action in Tea task (boiling 
water), she completed the task in 2 min 24 s, which was similar to DS (2 min 5 s), JF 
(2 min 21 s), and the control participants (1min 50 s). The overall time to complete 
the sandwich task was 3 min 40 s for BL, 1 min 57s for JF, 3 min 28 s for DS, and 1 
min 18s for normal controls. DS’s speed of action was hampered by his hemiplegia, 
which was not the case for any of the other participants. 
Overall BL took a mean of 182 sec to complete the tasks while the normal 
controls took 94 sec and the patient controls took 137.75 sec. BL made 211 eye 
movements, with the average duration of fixation being 143 ms. The normal control 
participants made a mean of 78.5 fixations which on average lasted 115 ms each. The 
control patients made 87 fixations lasting on average 125 ms.  
We analysed the ratio of number of fixations to time on task, comparing BL to 
the 4 controls in order to test if she made abnormally large or small numbers of 
fixations, given the length of time she took on the task. The comparison showed that 
BL made significantly more fixations during the task relative to the time taken; t (3) = 
5.08, p< .05 .The ratio of the number of fixations to the time on task did not differ 
between the two types of controls; p=0.25. Although BL showed increased numbers 
of fixations, the durations of the fixations did not differ from those of the controls 
(p>.14).  
We assessed BL’s eye movements in relation to her errors. For the Sequence 
error in the tea task, BL made two fixations on the teabag before starting to pour 
water into teapot (without putting the teabag in the pot).  In the Sandwich task BL 
made one toying error with the sandwich bag. In this case she made 7 fixations on the 
bag (average duration 407 ms) prior to the toying error occurring – these precursor 
eye movements occurred while BL spread cheese on one slice of bread and cut it in 
half. Subsequently she wrongly touched the sandwich bag and omitted using a second 
slice of bread to make the sandwich. The errors here seemed to reflect BL’s attention 
being attracted to the sandwich bag, so that she came back to re-fixate the bag even 
after looking away from it. We compared the time of unrelated fixations on the 
sandwich bag prior to her toying with the other fixations made in the sandwich task. 
This showed that BL’s fixations on the sandwich bag were shorter than her other 
fixations in the task (mean =1769 ms; p = .026). 
 
7.7.3 Task-based and predictive eye movements 
We assessed whether BL’s eye movements were linked to the ongoing action, and 
whether she made eye movements that were predictive of the next upcoming action 
(see Figure 11). BL made 108 fixations during the tea task, 90 of which were related 
to either the task at hand or to the next sequence of action; 18 were unrelated to 
ongoing or future actions. DS made 110 fixations (107 related and 3 unrelated) and JF 
made 112 fixations (105 related and 7 unrelated to action). Normal controls on 
average made 114 fixations in the tea task and there were only 2 fixations made by 
one control that were unrelated to the ongoing action. In the sandwich task BL fixated 
103 times (85 fixations related to ongoing or immediately following actions, and 18 
unrelated fixations). DS made 74 fixations with only 5 unrelated fixations, and JF 
made 51 task-related fixations and 1 unrelated fixation. The normal controls made on 
average 43 fixations during the sandwich task and there was just one task-unrelated 
fixation. The number of fixations that were related to ongoing or immediately up-
coming actions, or that were unrelated to ongoing actions, are presented in Figure 11. 
 
 Figure 11: Frequency of related and unrelated fixation to the next step of the 
tasks 
 The number of relevant compared to irrelevant fixations made by BL and the 
control patients were assessed in a chi square test (using the mean data across each set 
of controls). BL made proportionately more unrelated fixations than the patient 
controls, both for the tea task (χ2 (2)=14.7, p= .001) and the sandwich task (χ2 (2)= 
10.5, p= .005). Similarly she made proportionately more unrelated fixations compared 
to the normal participants; tea task: χ2 (2) = 24.9, p< .0001; sandwich task: χ2 (2) = 
13.7, p < .0001. There were no differences between control patients and normal 
controls (tea task, p= .187, and sandwich task, p= .063). 
      As an example of unrelated fixations to the next sequence of action, in the 
sequence of adding milk to a cup of tea BL fixated on the kettle, teabag, spoon, milk, 
sugar, milk, and milk top prior to move her hand to reach the milk.  During the same 
step in the task, all control participants fixated directly on milk. This suggests that the 
controls were better able to plan ahead their actions than BL. 
Careful inspection of irrelevant fixations shows that BL often performed some 
unrelated fixations between two sequences of the task, when she finished a sequence 
and went through to the next step. Fifteen out of 36 unrelated fixations occurred at 
these junctions. It seems that BL either was thinking about the next step trying to 
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identify objects that would be appropriate or she looked to find the relation between 
objects to remind the role of an object in the task to retrieve the next step. Given the 
evidence for BL having impaired knowledge about the order of steps in everyday 
tasks (Background tests), we propose that the latter strategy was the more likely. 
7.7.4 Type of fixation 
We classified the type of fixations into the categories, Locating, Directing, Guiding, 
and Checking according to Land et al.’s criteria (1999) for categorising the functions 
of different fixations. Table 13 shows the percentage of each type of fixations, relative 
to all the fixations made, for each participant in the specific task. Some of fixations 
could not be classified into any of the main fixation types; there were listed as “other” 
fixations that presented no obvious function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We analysed the proportions of the number of each type of fixation for BL and 
each control group, relative to the total numbers of fixations made, averaging across 
the two tasks and averaging performance across the two controls in each group.  BL 
tended to make higher proportions of locating fixations, relative to the total fixations, 
compared to the control patients (χ2 (1) = 5.48, p < 0.05) and to normal control 
participants (χ2 (1) = 8.13, p = 0.004). These increased proportions of locating 
fixations suggest that BL had difficulty maintaining information about the locations of 
objects during the task, and so needed to make relative high numbers of fixations 
where objects appeared to be re-located. Alternatively BL’s maintenance of semantic 
representations may have been poor, with semantic information decaying rapidly. 
Morady and Humphreys (2009b) reported that BL showed inconsistent recognition of 
objects across trials which is consistent with her having refractory semantic 
knowledge (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 1987), where semantic representations 
may fail to maintain an excitatory state after being activated. Due to this, BL may 
need to make re-locating fixations more than is normally the case. Similarly analysis 
for “other” type of fixation shows that BL significantly performed more “other” 
fixations than control patients (χ2 (1) =16.9, p< .0001) and normal controls (χ2 (1) = 
  Fixation type  Locating Directing Guiding Checking Other 
       
BL Tea 39 24 14 9 15 
 Sandwich 19 45 7 5 24 
       
DS Tea 28 38 12 9 13 
 Sandwich 15 51 17 9 7 
       
JF Tea 23 46 13 8 10 
 Sandwich 17 52 19 10 2 
             
Normal 
controls Tea 22 49 10 11 8 
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Table 13: Percentage of the number of each type of fixation 
16.3, p< .0001). The patient and control groups did not differ on any of the fixation 
types. 
 
7.7.5 The timing of fixations to object-related actions (ORAs) 
Figure 12 gives the overall pattern of ORAs for the two tasks, for BL and the controls. 
The pattern for the control patients DS and JF, as well as for the normal control 
participants, is very similar to that described in Land et al. (1999). Land et al. noted 
that actions are typically preceded about 0.5s earlier by an eye movement and, at the 
end of each ORA, the gaze typically moves on to the next object between 0 and 1s 
before the motor act has been completed. BL, similarly to the controls, made a 
saccade to an object on average 0.48s before acting upon. The time between the 
saccade and the first signs of a movement to contact the objects did not differ between 
BL and the control patients (F<1, treating each ORA as an independent observation). 
In contrast, BL’s eye movements to the next object in a sequence were made earlier 
than the controls; BL left the object 1.64s (± 1.04s) before completing an action, 
compared with 0.67s (± 0.08s) before the action in control patients, and 0.53 (± 0.08) 
in normal controls. The two control groups did not show any differences in the time 
when fixations left a target object (F<1). When compared with the combined data 
across the control groups, BL reliably made saccades to the next object earlier than 
the controls (F (1, 19) = 7.92, p < 0.05). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Time 
BL 
  visual fixation of object     
 0.48s   1.64s  
  Manipulation of object    
 
Control patients 
    visual fixation of object     
 0.52s   0.67s  
      manipulation of object    
 
Control participants 
    visual fixation of object     
 0.43s   0.53s  
      manipulation of object    
 
Figure 12: Illustration of the average timing of gaze movement to objects prior to 
action and movements of gaze off the objects prior to completion of the action 
for BL and the controls (patients and normals) 
 
7.8 Discussion 
The analysis of eye movements made by the ADS patient –BL– during everyday tasks 
showed patterns of behaviour that matched and that departed from the behaviours 
found in both normal control participants and non-ADS patients. Like control 
participants, BL made eye movements to objects prior to using them (ORAs), and the 
timing of these fixations did not differ from controls. BL also made proportionately 
similar numbers of directing, guiding and checking eye movements (following the 
terminology of Land et al., 1999). However, she made proportionately more ‘locating’ 
eye movements, more of her eye movements were unrelated to ongoing or 
immediately upcoming actions, and her eyes tended to move off from objects at an 
earlier time than normal, relative to when the action was completed. In addition to 
this, on the small number of trials where BL made toying errors she made multiple 
fixations to the object being ‘toyed with’, with her eyes sometimes returning to the 
object even after a saccade had been made to another stimulus. 
These eye movements are informative about the underlying problems BL has in 
performing everyday life tasks. The eye movements that were unrelated to the 
ongoing or immediately upcoming task can be linked to BL scanning the objects in 
order to invoke the next action step for the task. The screening of BL indicated that 
she has impaired knowledge about the order of steps in everyday life tasks, which 
may result in task performance becoming driven more strongly than normal by 
bottom-up information. We propose that the unrelated eye movements, across the 
different objects present, reflect attempts to activate task schema in a bottom-up 
fashion. 
On top of this, BL appeared to have problems in maintaining information about 
the locations of objects, so she makes increased proportions of ‘locating’ eye 
movements (where she looked at objects that would subsequently be used in the task 
in order to establish the location of objects without associated motor activity at the 
time of the fixation). We link these locating eye movements to BL either losing 
location information about the objects or to any semantic representations of the 
objects decaying, which leads to confusions in memory about where different objects 
are. BL had a reduced Corsi block span compared with normal (5), so it is possible 
that she would lose representations of the locations of the objects during task 
performance. On the other hand, her Corsi block span did not differ from that of the 
control patient DS, so it is not clear that loss of location information per se would be 
critical. Prior work with BL has indicated that she has inconsistent access to semantic 
information (Morady & Humphreys, 2009b, Chapter 5 here), which may reflect 
semantic representations entering a refractory state (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 
1987). If this is the case, then the semantic representations of objects may be 
inaccessible after initially being activated, causing her to mislocate a target object 
amongst other objects related to a common task. The ‘locating’ fixations may reflect 
an attempt to overcome this problem. 
The eye movements BL made before using an object were time-locked to the 
action in a quite normal way (when ORAs occurred). This is interesting in that it 
suggests a local-driven relationship between visual attention and action – with an 
action being triggered to an object following an immediately preceding fixation. This 
local relationship appears to be spared, despite BL’s problems with stored knowledge 
about the higher-order structure of the tasks. However, although the initiation of 
actions to objects were tied to eye movements in a relatively normal way, BL made 
earlier eye movements away from the objects than the control participants. This may 
be linked to an error-monitoring process. It may be that, in normal participants, the 
eyes linger sufficiently on an object that is being used in order to ensure that the 
action is being correctly executed. In BL this monitoring process may be deficient, so 
that actions are not then held upon the objects being used. It is possible that this 
‘holding’ of attention may be triggered in a top-down manner, perhaps by brain 
regions involved in error monitoring such as the anterior cingulate cortex (Blasi et al., 
2006; Carter et al., 1998). In BL the occipito-temporal lesion may disconnect earlier 
regions from this top-down input, disrupting the monitoring process. 
Additional evidence for impaired monitoring comes through the analysis of eye 
movements when toying responses were made. Toying responses were linked to BL 
making multiple, short fixations on objects. We suggest that these errors arise on 
occasions when a given object attracts attention (perhaps due to its position in the 
field or other bottom-up factors). The re-occurrence of the fixations, and the toying 
actions, indicates in turn that the actions (and eye movements) are disconnected from 
error monitoring processes on such occasions. These proposals match the data 
reported by Forde et al. (2009) in their analysis of patient FK’s eye movements when 
perseveration errors occurred, with multiple, brief eye movements again occurring. 
We speculate that these fleeting re-fixations reflect bottom-up driving of attention to a 
particular object in the absence of top-down monitoring of action. It will be 
interesting if future research confirms that such fixation patterns are characteristic of 
task-disconnected errors in such patients. 
 
Summary 
In sum, the present results indicate that eye movement patterns in ADS patients can be 
revealing about the nature of the underlying problems patients’ experience. There can 
be changes in both task-driven guidance of eye movements (e.g., in unrelated and 
locating fixations) and in the control of fixations through error monitoring, and in the 
latter case, poor task-control leads to overly-strong bottom up cueing of saccades.  
  
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
8.1 Conclusion 
Over the past two decades or so there has been an increasing volume of research 
investigating the generation and control of actions in naturalistic, everyday tasks, such 
as making a cup of tea. Despite such activities being routine, there are numerous 
different process involved– from recognising the objects, to retrieving the task schema 
and ordering the sequence of steps of each task. This thesis has spanned the cognitive 
demands of simple everyday action and the influence of aspects of everyday action 
(such as using objects) on the process of both recognizing objects and performing 
actions.  
The first empirical chapter sought to assess the influence of increasing and 
decreasing the cognitive resources needed for successful action in a patient with 
apparent action disorganization syndrome, FK. Performance was assessed in the 
context of when the tasks were performed with related or unrelated distractors present 
amongst the objects required for the task. The number of errors made overall by FK 
increased in the related condition compared with the basic condition, when there were 
no distractors present. Performance when there were unrelated distractors present fell 
in-between. Moreover, FK made relatively more step omissions when related 
distractors were present. A subsequent comparison was made between FK’s data and 
those of controls in a dual-task load condition (Experiment 2 of Chapter 2). While the 
increasing the cognitive demands of the tasks influence overall numbers of errors in 
the controls, there were no relative increases in omission errors. This points to a 
difference between the ADS patient and controls performing under load conditions, 
with omission errors particular to the patient.  To account for these data I suggested 
that the patient, FK, had relatively greater difficulty than controls in selecting the 
appropriate object to use when related distractors were present. This selective increase 
in demand led to FK making more omission errors. In contrast, the dual task might 
introduce more noise for the controls, but this is not selective to when related objects 
are present. The net result was a selective increase in omissions for FK. The chapter 
illustrates that ADS patients may suffer from particular demands on particular 
processes (the selection of target objects), not found in control participants even under 
load conditions. 
The role of task schema in ADS was examined in Chapter 3. The chapter 
examined whether ADS patients have at least partial knowledge of task schema by 
having the patients instruct another person how to perform everyday tasks. The 
patients were better able to instruct the examiner to do the task compared to when 
they did the tasks themselves. This shows that patients can retrieve appropriate task 
schema when they are not involved in doing the task. The demands due to retrieving 
task schema as tasks are performed, and the demands due to having to monitor errors 
while the tasks are performed, was subsequently tested. The requirement to retrieve 
task schema was reduced by giving verbal cues for the task steps in one part, while 
the demands on error monitoring were reduced by both instructing the actions and 
giving the patients feedback when errors occurred. These conditions improved the 
patients’ performance, suggesting that the demand on retrieving schema while the task 
is performed and the demands on error monitoring, can both generate errors. In 
addition, errors when instructions were given reduced when the instructions were 
drawn randomly from tasks rather than the actions being performed in a consecutive 
order. This indicates that, under conditions of the correct order, there may be failures 
to inhibit activated actions along also with increased activation of upcoming actions. 
A failure to inhibit, along with the extra competition from activated upcoming actions, 
can lead to patients making increased action errors. 
Two of the basic requirements of carrying out everyday tasks are to recognize 
the objects present and to enact the action correctly. The interactions between 
perception and action were examined in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 analysed one 
common finding in the literature on disorders of action (apraxia) – that patients can 
typically use objects more accurately than they can pantomime them. Chapter 4 
focused on two patients, FK and BL, both of whom had problems in object 
recognition in addition to any problems in making single actions to objects. The ‘use 
advantage’ was demonstrated both for objects the patients could recognize and for 
objects that they were impaired at recognizing. The data are consistent with object use 
being cued by direct sensory inputs to action knowledge, by-passing impaired 
semantics in the patients. This fits with a dual-route account of action retrieval, in 
which convergent sensory and perceptual inputs combine with semantic inputs to 
ensure the correct action is selected (Chainay & Humphreys, 2002; Riddoch et al., 
1989; Yoon et al., 2002).  
Chapter 5 examined the converse case, which is where object recognition 
appeared to be affected by object use. In this instance, the ADS patients were better 
able to name objects after they had used them, compared with they simply saw, 
touched or touched and saw the objects (but did not use them). To account for these 
data, I argued that the patients used the objects directly, without accessing semantic 
knowledge, and then accessed semantic knowledge on the basis of the action being 
performed. Object identification can benefit from object use. 
Apraxia is a cognitive impairment following stroke that can have major 
impact on independence in activities of daily living. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
studies of rehabilitation of apraxia have focused on re-training gesture production 
(e.g. Maher, Rothi, and Greenwald, 1991). The previous researches suggest that 
patients are able to re-acquire gestures and re-learn how to perform a task. In Chapter 
6 of this thesis, I sought to see the influence of re-learning transitive and intransitive 
gestures in a patient with both aphasia and apraxia (DS). The treatment consisted of  
presenting DS with multiple cues to using a given tool (a picture, a real object, a 
visual model, copying and feedback) and asking him to demonstrate the use of the 
target. The results showed an improvement at making transitive gestures for the 
trained objects. However, there was no generalization of training in apraxia which fits 
with prior studies on rehabilitation of apraxia (e.g. Ochipa et al., 1991). These data 
suggest that practised actions may be represented by a whole motor programme not 
easily broken down into constituent parts, and so practising this action does not easily 
generalize to other actions. 
In Chapter 7, eye movements were measured while a patient with ADS carried 
out everyday tasks.   Eye movement patterns in the ADS patient matched in some 
respects, but departed in others, from those found in both normal control participants 
and non-ADS patients. However, the ADS patient made proportionately more 
“locating” eye movements (following the terminology of Land et al., 1999), and 
proportionately more of their eye movements were unrelated to ongoing or 
immediately upcoming actions. The results showed that there can be changes in both 
task-driven guidance of eye movements  and in the control of fixations through error 
monitoring; for example,  ‘locating’ fixations in the ADS patient occurred more 
frequently than in the controls, while  there were more fixations that were unrelated to 
the ongoing task. Such ‘unrelated’ fixation may arise due to poor top-down activation 
of schema, resulting in a lack of top-down guidance to the appropriate objects for 
action.  
Taken together the results conform to the view that action retrieval is 
influenced by inputs from multi-modal systems which converge to determine action 
selection, that action information can be derived rapidly and influences both object 
processing and the allocation of attention, and that action information can break down 
at different levels, giving rise to different problems in performing everyday tasks. 
 
 
 
 
8.2 Relevance to theories 
(i) Direct routes to action 
The results presented in Chapters 4 and 5, dealing with the relations between 
perception and action, fit with ‘dual route’ accounts of action retrieval. Traditional 
models of action retrieval suppose that this is mediated by access to semantic 
knowledge about the objects, when they are usually encountered and what they co-
occur with (Roy & Square, 1985). However, I showed that there was an advantage for 
using objects, compared to when actions were pantomimed, even for objects that 
could not be recognised. In such cases the ‘use advantage’ does not come through 
semantic knowledge, but rather through direct perceptual activation of the action 
schema. I also showed that objects could be named more accurately after a patient had 
used them, compared with when equivalent perceptual input was present but the 
objects were not used. To account for this I proposed that the directly activated 
actions were identified, and from this the patients identified the objects. 
 
(ii) Interactions of attention and stored action knowledge 
The data reported in the thesis also point to the importance of attentional interactions 
with stored knowledge when patients carry out everyday life tasks. In Chapter 2 
evidence was presented that a patient with ADS, FK, faced particular difficulty in 
selecting target objects from related distractors, and the increased demands on 
selection led to FK making more omissions than was the case for control participants. 
Here the demands on visual selection seemed to reduce the resources for other aspects 
of task performance, such as error monitoring. 
In Chapter 3 two ADS patients were shown to have reasonably intact spared 
schema for tasks, since they were often able to instruct controls to carry out the tasks. 
Despite this, the demands of having to retrieve the task schema, while carrying out the 
tasks themselves, induced errors in the patients.  The patients also made more errors 
when instructed to carry out actions in the standard sequence for a task, compared 
with when the instructions were drawn at random from different tasks. To account for 
this I proposed that actions coming from a single task activate upcoming actions more 
strongly than randomly sampled actions, and there are also increased demands on 
inhibiting actions that have been performed. The net result is that instructions 
following the course of a task can disrupt performance.  
 The most explicit account of the relations between task schema and attention 
is provided by the SAS-CSS model proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986). The 
first part of their model, the Contention Scheduling System (CSS), was designed to 
explain how we might execute routine tasks. The CSS contains hierarchically-
organized schema for action which are activated by stimuli in the environment. They 
suggested that we store schemas for routine tasks and, when a triggering stimulus 
activates a schema above its threshold, that schema would remain active until the goal 
is attained or the schema is actively inhibited by competing schemas. Thus, CSS 
regulates activation so that the correct actions are made in the correct order. They 
proposed a second system, the Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) concerned with 
non-routine, intentional or willed action that would require higher order cognitive 
control. The SAS would be required monitor for errors, while the CSS would operate 
the running of routine behaviours. The data reported in Chapter 3, that errors 
decreased in ADS patients when the need to monitor for errors decreased, is 
consistent with these patients having a problem in the SAS, and with this problem 
being by-passed under the appropriate presentation conditions (e.g., giving task 
instructions with feedback). However, the fact that errors decreased further when 
actions are not performed in the set order for the task suggests that there are 
attentional demands within the running of the routine behaviour itself that the CSS is 
not immune from. For example, activation from previously performed actions, or 
from upcoming actions, may need to be resolved when actions are carried out in the 
standard consecutive order. The data presented here indicate that ADS patients can 
have problems in over-ruling such activations, and consequently make errors under 
the consecutive action conditions. This in turn indicates either that they have problem 
in recruiting attentional resources to modulate the CSS or that there are impairments 
within the CSS that disrupt the normal ‘automatic’ processes that resolves competition 
between representations. The fact that normal participants do make errors in everyday 
tasks when under dual task load, however, suggests that the CSS is sensitive to 
attentional modulation. The attentional modulation of the CSS may be something that 
is impaired in ADS. 
 
(iii) The nature of action representations 
Chapter 6 presented data on the retraining of ideomotor apraxia. As in prior studies on 
this topic (Maher, Rothi and Greenwald, 1991; Pilgrim and Humphreys, 1994; Ochipa 
et al., 1991), there was evidence for re-learning of actions to objects, but this did not 
generalize away from the training set. The result is of interest for theories of motor 
programming. One approach to motor programming has been to assume that complex 
programs are assembled from components of individual actions, based on components 
of action such as the joint angle, movement of particular muscles or the direction or 
velocity of the effector is coded (e.g., Scott & Kalasks, 1997; Cabel, Cisek & Scott, 
2001; Reina, Moran & Schwartz, 2001). More recently, however, Graziano and 
colleagues (Graziano, Taylor and Moore (2002) have reported evidence that micro-
stimulastion of primary motor cortex generates not component movements but whole 
complex actions (e.g., based on the movement of an arm through a particular spatial 
trajectory). These data suggest a change in the way we think about motor programs, 
suggesting that programs might be stored as complex whole representations rather 
than being constructed out of individual components. The results presented here, on 
item-specific learning of actions that do not generalise, are consistent with this 
proposal. It appears that patients can re-learn a whole action to a given object, but 
since the action to another object will differ from this (and even if some of the 
components overlap) then the re-learning does not generalise. 
 
8.3 Limits and merits of the approach 
The approach taken in this thesis has been to examine, in some detail, a small number 
of patients selected on the basis of their clinical symptoms (ADS, apraxia, agnosia). 
The merit of this approach is that it facilitates the detailed analysis of the factors that 
might ‘drive’ performance in everyday-life tasks. By analysing the patients in detail 
here, I have shown (e.g.,) that there is an increased role of semantic distractors in 
ADS patients compared with controls operating under dual-task load (Chapter 2), that 
there can be a breakdown due to actions being conducted in a standard order (Chapter 
3) and that patterns of eye movements in ADS patients can be subtly different 
compared with controls (Chapter 7). Once these critical factors have been identified 
through detailed case studies, their more general impact can be assessed in larger 
group studies. 
 Although having several merits, the approach also has several limitations. At a 
practical level, considerable care needs to be taken to ensure that differences across 
task conditions are not due to general factors such as practice, as opposed to the 
specific variables being manipulated in the tasks. There are also constraints on the 
way the data can be analysed. Throughout the thesis, the data have been analysed 
where possible using ANOVAs, even for single cases, with task being included as 
‘subject’. This capitalises on the power of ANOVAs (e.g., to assess for interactions), 
but it does make assumptions about the data being independent on different test 
occasions, and it could increase the likelihood of a Type I error. On the other hand, 
non-independence of the data (e.g., due to priming from one condition to another) 
would be more likely to reduce rather than increase differences between the 
conditions, while analysing the data over tasks (e.g.) does ensure that any statistical 
inferences generalise.  
 
8.4 Conclusions 
The present results highlight the complexity of performing everyday tasks. The 
detailed single case analyses have indicated that performance can break down in a 
number of ways reflecting factors such as the increased competition for selection 
(effects of semantic relatedness in Chapter 2) and the inappropriate spread of 
activation when the steps in tasks are performed in a habitual order (Chapter 3). I 
have also shown ways that patient performance can be facilitated (Chapters 4 and 5). 
This work provides the basis for additional group-based studies, where the generality 
of the findings across different classes of patient can be explored. 
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 Appendix A 
 
Norms for action schema 
 
 Make a cup of tea with milk and sugar  
(kettle, teapot, spoon, teabags, cup, milk, sugar) 
 
o let the kettle boil 
o put a teabag in the teapot 
o pour hot water into teapot 
o put milk in the cup 
o pour tea into the cup 
o put sugar in the tea 
o stir the tea 
 
 Make a cheese sandwich and put it in a sandwich bag 
(bread, cheese, plate, knife, sandwich bags) 
 
o put bread on the plate 
o put cheese on the bread 
o put the other slice of the bread on top 
o cut the sandwich in half 
o put it in a sandwich bag 
 
 Wrap a gift 
(wrapping paper, selotape, gift, scissors, bow) 
 
o unfold the paper 
o put the gift in the centre 
o cut the paper 
o fold the paper over the gift 
o secure with selotape 
o fix one end 
o fix the other end 
o stick the bow on top 
 
 Write and post a card 
(card, pen, stamp, envelope) 
 
o write the card 
o sign the card 
o put the card in the envelope 
o seal the envelope 
o write the address on the envelope 
o lick the stamp 
o stick the stamp on the envelope 
 
 
 Appendix B 
 
Transitive objects 
 
 Salt-shaker 
 Scissors 
 Ice-cream scoop 
 Razor 
 Hairbrush 
 Key 
 Hammer 
 Pen 
 Table spoon 
 Toothbrush 
 Lighter 
 Cup 
 Knife 
 Paintbrush 
 Mirror 
 Pipe 
 Glass 
 Measuring cup 
 Paperclip 
 Eyeglasses 
 Whistle 
 Torch 
 Screwdriver 
 Dice 
 Ashtray 
 Ball 
 Comb 
 Saw 
 Spanner 
 Watch 
 Shaving brush 
 Telephone 
 Wooden spoon 
 Washing brush 
 Teaspoon 
 Can opener 
 Fork 
 Chisel 
 Sharpener 
 Whisk 
 Pliers 
 Matches 
 Stapler 
 Grater 
 Pizza cutter 
 Ladle 
 Clothe peg
 
 
 
Intransitive items 
 
Symbolic gestures
 Wave goodbye 
 Snap your fingers 
 Hitchhiking 
 Salute like a soldier 
 Signal stop with your hand 
 Blow a kiss 
 Signal quiet with your finger to your 
lips 
 Make a “V” for victory 
 Come here 
 Go away 
 Point to me 
 Okay sign
Non-symbolic gestures
 Put your hand on opposite shoulder 
 Put your fist on your chest 
 Put your hand over your ear 
 Put your palm on your forehead 
 Put your fingers on your chain 
 Point to your nose 
 Make a circle in the air 
 Clap your hands 
 Point to the floor 
 Join your index fingers 
 Point to the ceiling 
 Point to your forehead
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copying 
 
Meaningless gesture
 Hand on lips and then forehead 
 Hand on nose and the ear
 Two hands open and close 
 Hand to forehead and down on the table 
 Hand on table makes circle 
 Making square on the air
 
 
Meaningfull gesture 
 
• Saltshaker 
• Saw 
• Cup 
• Knife 
• Toothbrush 
• Key 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix C 
 
 
Object Naming 
List of objects:
 Salt shaker (whistle) 
 Scissors 
 Ice-cream scoop 
 Razor (hammer) 
 Hairbrush (paintbrush) 
 Key (lighter) 
 Hammer (razor) 
 Pen (knife) 
 Table spoon 
 Toothbrush (comb) 
 Lighter (key) 
 Cup 
 Knife (pen) 
 Paintbrush (hairbrush) 
 Mirror 
 Pipe 
 Glass 
 Measuring cup 
 Paperclip 
 Eyeglasses 
 Whistle (salt shaker) 
 Torch (whisk) 
 Screwdriver (saw) 
 Dice 
 
In bold, items used in Experiment 2. In 
brackets the action used on an incorrect 
gesture trial. 
 
 Ashtray 
 Ball 
 Comb (toothbrush) 
 Saw (screwdriver) 
 Spanner 
 Watch 
 Shaving brush (washing brush) 
 Telephone 
 Wooden spoon 
 Washing brush (shaving brush) 
 Teaspoon(chisel) 
 Can opener 
 Fork 
 Chisel (teaspoon) 
 Sharpener 
 Whisk (torch) 
 Pliers 
 Matches 
 Stapler 
 Grater 
 Pizza cutter 
 Ladle 
 Clothes peg 
 
 
 
Perceptual matching 
     Target object / Matched object
Hammer/ Spanner 
Mirror/ comb 
Screwdriver/ spanner 
Toothbrush/ paintbrush 
Whisk/ grater 
Razor/ shaving brush 
Pipe/ lighter 
Knife/ fork 
Scissors/ pliers 
Hairbrush/ washing brush 
Cup/ mug 
Glass/ vase 
Pen/ pencil 
Torch/ lighter 
Measuring cup/ vase 
Saltshaker/ glass 
Can opener/ scissors 
Wooden spoon/ ladle 
Teaspoon/ ice-cream scoop 
Stapler/ hole-punch 
Key/ paperclip 
Chisel/ saw 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Semantic match (name/object) 
 
Target object  Semantically related object  Distractor 
Hammer Nail  Screw 
Razor  Shaving brush  Paintbrush 
Fork  Knife  Cup 
Sharpener  Pencil  Pen 
Pipe  Lighter  Torch 
Key  Lock  Paperclip 
Can opener  Can  Knife 
Hole punch  Paper  Card 
Saw  Piece of wood  Plate 
Spanner  Nut  Nail 
Toothbrush  Toothpaste  Soap 
Whisk  Bowl  Plate 
Scissors  Paper  Sharpener 
Mirror Comb  Toothpaste 
Stapler  Staple  Hole punch 
Card  Stamp  Sharpener 
Paintbrush  Painting colour  Hairbrush 
Eraser  Pencil  Pen 
Candle  Matches  Torch 
Chisel Piece of wood Scissors 
Tea bag  Cup Glass 
Torch  Battery  Matches 
Knife  Onion  Scissors 
Ink  Pen  Pencil 
Fork  Knife  Saw 
APPENDIX D 
 
List of objects in Experiment  
 
5. Scissors 
6. Razor 
7. Hairbrush 
8. Key 
9. Hammer 
10. Pen 
11. Table spoon 
12. Toothbrush 
13. Cup 
14. Knife 
15. Paintbrush 
16. Mirror 
17. Pipe 
18. Screwdriver 
19. Fork 
20. Whisk 
21. Pliers 
22. Ice-cream scoop 
23. Chisel 
24. Ladle 
25. Wooden spoon 
26. Grater 
27. Washing brush 
28. Pizza cutter 
29. Saw 
30. Spanner 
31. Shaving brush 
32. Eye glasses 
 
